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AN AMERICAN RESET — SAFE WATER & A 
WORKABLE MODEL OF FEDERALISM 
CARA CUNNINGHAM WARREN† 
ABSTRACT 
In 2015, at least 3.9 million Americans were exposed to lead in their 
drinking water at legally unacceptable levels.1  An additional 18 million 
Americans were at risk because their water systems were not in 
compliance with federal rules designed to detect the presence of lead 
contamination and to ameliorate its impact.2  What’s more, in 82 percent 
of the cases where the violation related to a health standard, no formal 
state or federal enforcement action was taken.3 
These startling statistics indicate that the Flint Water Crisis (“Flint 
Water”) is not an isolated event.  In fact, it is a case study that might 
explain these statistics.  Flint Water reveals a fault line within our 
cooperative federalism model:  We are relying on an increasingly 
ineffective power structure to guarantee the safety of our water supply, 
one that places the heaviest burden on the least powerful actor—the 
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1. ERIC OLSEN & KRISTI PULLEN, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, WHAT’S IN YOUR WATER?
FLINT AND BEYOND—ANALYSIS OF EPA DATA REVEALS WIDESPREAD LEAD CRISIS 
POTENTIALLY AFFECTING MILLIONS OF AMERICANS 5 (2016), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/def 
ault/files/whats-in-your-water-flint-beyond-report.pdf [hereinafter WIDESPREAD LEAD CRISIS].  
Federal law distinguishes between maximum contaminant levels or action levels and maximum 
contaminant goals.  The goals are just that, while the maximum contaminant levels set enforceable 
standards based on what is economically and technically achievable.  DENISE SCHEBERLE, 
FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: TRUST AND THE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
128–29 ( 2d ed. 2004).  For example, the maximum contaminant goal for lead is zero because of 
its significant health effects.  CITY OF FLINT, EPA DOC. NO. SDWA 05-2015-000, EMERGENCY 
ADMIN. REP. ¶ 27 (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-01/documents 
/1_21_sdwa_1431_emergency_admin_order_012116.pdf  [hereinafter FLINT ADMINISTRATIVE 
ORDER].  Whereas the action level for lead is fifteen parts per billion.  40 C.F.R. § 141.80(b)(1). 
It is a violation of this latter standard that affects the 3.9 million Americans. 
2. WIDESPREAD LEAD CRISIS, supra note 1, at 5.
3. Id. at 6.
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water supplier.  This article proposes a ‘reset’ of the model in order to 
achieve safe water and government accountability. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine this headline flashing across your screen:  City of 100,000 
Poisoned by Local Water.  State and Federal Officials Pointing Fingers 
as Proof of Cover-ups and Gross Misconduct Comes to Light.  Now 
consider your first impression.  Did you doubt the story or assume it 
happened in a third-world country?  Or did you feel a sense of relief 
that at least your community was not affected? 
Here is the problem:  The story is true.  Beginning in 2014, Flint 
residents were poisoned by lead in their drinking water.  At the same 
time, state and local officials repeatedly assured residents the water 
was safe, in spite of mounting evidence it was not.4 
The Flint water crisis is a story of government failure, intransigence, 
unpreparedness, delay, inaction, and environmental injustice.5 The 
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) failed in 
its fundamental responsibility to effectively enforce drinking water 
regulations . . . [T]he MDEQ[] stubbornly worked to discredit and 
dismiss others’ attempts to bring the issues of unsafe water, lead 
contamination, and increased cases of Legionellosis (Legionnaires’ 
disease) to light. With the City of Flint under emergency 
management, the Flint Water Department rushed unprepared into 
fulltime operation of the Flint Water Treatment Plant, drawing 
water from a highly corrosive source without the use of corrosion 
control. Though MDEQ was delegated primacy (authority to 
enforce federal law), the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) delayed enforcement of the Safe Drinking Water Act 
(SDWA) and Lead and Copper Rule (LCR), thereby prolonging the 
calamity. Neither the Governor nor the Governor’s office took steps 
to reverse poor decisions by MDEQ and state-appointed emergency 
managers [from at least April 2014] until October 2015, in spite of 
 
 4. See Jeremy C.F. Lin, Jean Rutter, & Haeyoun Park, Events That Led to Flint’s Water 
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/21/us/flint-lead-
water-timeline.html (recounting the timeline of events that occurred in Flint leading up to and 
during the water crisis). 
 5. There is no question that Flint Water is a case of environmental injustice.  FLINT WATER 
ADVISORY TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 1, 54 (2016), www.michigan.gov/documents/snyder 
/FWATF_FINAL_REPORT_21March2016_517805_7.pdf [hereinafter FLINT FINAL REPORT].  
The crisis reflects a callous disregard for the lives and dignity of Flint residents, who are among 
the most economically disadvantaged in the country and who are majority African American.  It 
also reflects the lack of representation or participation they had in their community and its water 
supply system.  The author applauds the Taskforce for making this finding and raising awareness 
of this deplorable state of affairs.  This paper will not explore this perspective in great detail, 
however, because it is urging that Flint Water will repeat itself in cities across the United States, 
regardless of whether environmental injustice is present. 
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mounting problems and suggestions to do so by senior staff members 
in the Governor’s office, in part because of continued reassurances 
from MDEQ that the water was safe. The significant consequences 
of these failures for Flint will be long-lasting. They have deeply 
affected Flint’s public health, its economic future, and residents’ 
trust in government.6 
Flint Water also did not occur in a third-world country.  Flint is in 
the State of Michigan, a state ranked fourth in the United States for its 
water quality7 and surrounded by the Great Lakes, the source of one-
fifth of the Earth’s fresh surface water supply.8 
Finally, it is doubtful that Flint Water is an isolated incident.9   
According to the Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”),10 the 
EPA’s official data reveal that millions of Americans are either already 
being poisoned by lead in their drinking water or are at risk of being 
poisoned.11 
Flint Water is shocking from a human and moral perspective, but 
it also reveals a pernicious problem with our current federalism model 
that might explain the startling statistics above: we are relying on an 
increasingly inappropriate power structure to guarantee the safety of 
our water supply, one that places the heaviest burden on the least 
powerful actor—the water supplier. 
 
 6. Id. at 1. The Taskforce members were appointed by Michigan governor, Rick Snyder.  
The list of members and their qualifications are found in Appendix I of their report. 
 7. John Kiernan, 2016’s Greenest States, WALLETHUB, Sept.. 30, 2016, https://wallethub. 
com/edu/greenest-states/11987/#red-vs-blue. 
 8. Facts and Figures, GREAT LAKES INFO. NETWORK, http://www.great-lakes.net/lakes/ref 
/lakefact.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2016) [hereinafter GREAT LAKES INFO NETWORK]. 
 9. This is troubling particularly since the average family in the U.S. consumes more than 
120 gallons of water per day.  (The total amount is more than 300 gallons of water per day, but 
the 120-gallon figure excludes water uses that would not affect human health (i.e., water used for 
toilets or lost because of leaks)).  See Water Use Today, U.S. EPA & WATER SENSE, https://www3 
.epa.gov/watersense/our_water/water_use_today.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2016). 
 10. The Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) is a not-for-profit organization 
founded in 1970 by law students and attorneys.  It now has more than two million members.  Its 
mission is to “safeguard the earth—its people, its plants and animals, and the natural systems on 
which all life depends.” About Us, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, https://www.nrdc.org/about (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2016).  It should be noted that, “NRDC and the American Civil Liberties Union 
of Michigan served upon EPA a petition on behalf of Flint residents on October 1, 2015, 
requesting an intervention many months before the agency issued an administrative order on 
January 21, 2016, directed at city and state officials.  Ultimately, NRDC and ACLU-MI also filed 
litigation on behalf of local citizens in an effort to address Flint’s water woes.” WIDESPREAD 
LEAD CRISIS, supra note 1, at 4. 
 11. See WIDESPREAD LEAD CRISIS, supra note 1, at 5 (finding that “over 18 million people 
were served by 5,363 community water systems that violated the Lead and Copper Rule” in 2015, 
including failures to test, report, and treat water contaminated by lead or were found to have 
“conditions that could result in lead contamination”). 
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This paper begins by exploring America’s federalism roots and the 
creation of our current cooperative federalism model, which is 
reflected in the Safe Drinking Water Act of 197412 and the 1991 Lead 
and Copper Rule.13  Section Three identifies the structural challenges 
of the cooperative federalism model.  Section Four explores the base 
facts of Flint Water as well as the historical and political context in 
which this behavior occurred.  In this way, Flint Water can be seen as 
a case study for the flaws of cooperative federalism.  The final section 
suggests exploring a collaborative or polyphonic14 federalism model to 
provide safe water. 
II. FEDERALISM & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
A. The Beginning 
1.  American Roots 
Our founding fathers are credited with creating modern 
federalism,15 a form of government that allocates power between 
multiple sovereigns within a single territory.16  Their action marked a 
radical departure from the governing philosophy of the time that 
sovereignty, by definition, was indivisible.17  Indeed, it was the 
“eighteenth century’s conviction that there must be in every state, if it 
were to be a state, an indissoluble supreme power.”18  Wood vividly 
describes the strength of this sentiment: 
A state with more than one independent sovereign power within its 
boundaries was a violation of the unity of nature; it would be like a 
monster with more than one head, continually at war with itself, an  
 
 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 300f (2012). 
 13. 40 C.F.R. § 141.80 (2015). 
 14. Polyphony is a style of musical composition that employs two or more simultaneous but 
relatively independent melodic lines. 
 15. See ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 1–
2 (2010); FORREST MCDONALD, STATES’ RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO 1776–
1876, viii ( 2000). 
 16. MCDONALD, supra note 15, at viii. 
 17. Id. at 1. 
 18. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 345 
(1998).  Sir William Blackstone expresses the same sentiment: “There is and must be in every 
state a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority in which the jura summi imperii, in 
the rights of sovereignty, reside.”  WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 48–49 (1765).  This is not to say that the sovereign could not delegate authority to a 
sub-unit within the territory, but the unit’s authority, even if it is self-governing, emanates from 
and is subordinate to the sovereign.  MCDONALD, supra note 15, at 1–2. 
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absurd chaotic condition that could result only in the dissolution of 
the state.19 
And yet, by the second half of the eighteenth century20 and 
certainly by the 1787 Constitutional Convention, our founding fathers 
moved away from this indivisible conception of sovereignty to the idea 
of dual sovereignty (i.e., imperium in imperio or supreme power within 
supreme power).21  Justice Kennedy has spoken proudly about this 
American contribution. 
Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery. The Framers split the 
atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens 
would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each 
protected from incursion by the other. The resulting Constitution 
created a legal system unprecedented in form and design, 
establishing two orders of government, each with its own direct 
relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and 
obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it.22 
LaCroix suggests the action was a mix of necessity and theory.23  
This new philosophy that splits power between two sovereigns was 
necessary (and realistic) in the sense that only a centralized 
government could address the challenges facing the new nation,24 yet 
 
 19. WOOD, supra note 18, at 345–46, citing ISSAC KING, THE POLITICAL FAMILY 6–7 (James 
Humphreys, Jr. 1775). 
 20. See LACROIX, supra note 15, at 7–8.  LaCroix challenges the position that federalism 
originated at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, arguing that the concept of federalism was 
created in time between 1764 and 1802, and some of the ideas that provided a conceptual 
framework for our Founders date back to the late 16th and early 17th centuries. Id. at 11.  
McDonald evaluates colonial acceptance of dual sovereigns from an institutional perspective, 
noting a certain level of imperial-federal continuity in the second half of the 18th century.  While 
the British viewed Parliament as the supreme authority or sovereign over all matters, colonists 
were living in a de facto state of divided sovereignty.  They recognized the power of Parliament 
in things pertaining to the empire as a whole, like trade and foreign relations, but the colonies 
exercised sovereignty with respect to internal concerns. MCDONALD, supra note 15, at 2. 
McDonald does acknowledge that the colonies were not completely independent with respect to 
internal matters in the sense that colonial legislation was reviewable and could be disallowed by 
Britain; however, the power was erratically exercised, and disallowance rates were very low 
(approximately 5 percent (i.e., 469 disallowances out of 8563 reviews)). Id. 
 21. MCDONALD, supra note 15, at viii. 
 22. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); 
See also EUGENE HICKOK, WHY STATES? THE CHALLENGE OF FEDERALISM 15 (2007) (“[The 
Constitution] held out the proposition that the nation would benefit from an energetic but limited 
national government while simultaneously nurturing and being nurtured by sovereign, politically 
vital states and communities. . . . A nation where states matter.”). 
 23. LACROIX, supra note 15, at 2. 
 24. See HICKOK, supra note 22, at 8 (noting James Madison’s strategy to convince delegates 
that the existing Articles of Confederation, regardless of the strength of the confederation itself, 
were inadequate to the task and that a new, truly national government was needed). 
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strong and fiercely independent state governments already existed.25  
The action also was rooted in the theory that “a republic could not 
easily be maintained across a large territory.”26 
2. Dual Federalism 
Originally “the states and the national government each enjoyed 
exclusive authority over defined and non-overlapping realms.”27  This 
approach is known as “dual federalism,”28 which, by virtue of affording 
mutually exclusive powers to the state and national governments, made 
“conflicts between the two appear[] unlikely.”29  The authority granted 
to the new national government was also intended to be limited. 
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal 
government are few and defined.  Those which are to remain in the 
State governments are numerous and indefinite.  The former will 
express principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, 
and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for 
the most part, be connected.  The powers reserved to the several 
States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of 
affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and 
the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the States.30 
In this dual-federalism era, environmental matters generally fell 
to the states as an issue of land use.31  With respect to water specifically, 
 
 25. LACROIX, supra note 15, at 2. “Given the long separate political identity of the states, 
only a political organization that gave a strong role to states was politically viable. Virginia had 
existed for over 150 years before the Declaration of Independence; Massachusetts was only 
slightly younger. The Constitution had to recognize that organizational reality.” ROBERT A. 
SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
33 (2009). 
 26. LACROIX, supra note 15, at 2; see HICKOK, supra note 22, at 9–10.  Contrast this with 
Madison’s position that “a large, extended republic would embrace a ‘multiplicity of interests’ 
making it less likely that an interest ‘adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent 
and aggregate interest of the community’ could prevail.” Id. at 10 referring to, but not citing to 
THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 10, 51 (James Madison). 
 27. SCHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 33. 
 28. Id. Chief Justice Roger Taney would later describe it: “The powers of the General 
Government, and of the State, although both exist and are exercised within the same territorial 
limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each 
other within their respective spheres.”  Id. at 35, citing Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S.  506, 516 (1859). 
 29. SCHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 33.  One leader in Virginia noted how the general and state 
governments acted within different spheres and “[b]eing for two different purposes, as long as 
they are limited to the different objects, they can no more clash than two parallel lines can meet.”  
Id.,  citing 3 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 301 (Jonathan Elliot 
ed., 2d ed., 1888). 
 30. THE FEDERALIST No. 45. (Alexander Hamilton). 
 31. Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 
56 EMORY L.J. 159, n.10 (2006). 
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in the late 1700’s and early 1800’s, cities and towns began creating 
public water supply systems or purchasing those that had been 
previously owned by private companies.32  By 1860, there were over 
400 water systems, and the number grew to over 3,000 by 1900.33  
Today, there are approximately 155,000 public water systems in the 
United States that service almost ninety percent of the population.34  
Of those that are community water systems, 83.8 percent are locally 
owned,35 and that number is increasing.36   Before 1970, these systems 
were not generally regulated at the federal level.37 
B. The Shift—Cooperative Federalism 
The Supreme Court continues to iterate the power of sovereign 
states and has recently interpreted the Constitution to require “that 
Congress treat the States in a manner consistent with their status as 
residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the governance of the 
Nation.”38   Since our founding, however, questions of federalism have 
focused on states’ rights,39 as federal power has become more 
expansive than was proposed and ratified originally.40 
 
 32. William E. Cox, Evolution of the Safe Drinking Water Act: A Search for Effective Quality 
Assurance Strategies and Workable Concepts of Federalism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y. 
REV. 69, 72–73 (1997); FOOD & WATER WATCH, THE STATE OF PUBLIC WATER IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 3–4 (2016), http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/sites/default/files/report_state_of_public 
_water.pdf [hereinafter FOOD & WATER WATCH]. 
 33. Cox, supra note 32, at 72–73. 
 34. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Drinking Water Requirements for States and Public Water 
Systems, Information About Public Water Systems, https://www.epa.gov/dwreginfo/information-a 
bout-public-water-systems (last updated Dec. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Drinking Water 
Requirements]. 
 35. FOOD & WATER WATCH, supra note 32, at 3. 
 36. Id. at 2, 4. 
 37. Cox, supra note 32.  Federal jurisdiction in the early 20th century focused on inter-state 
carriers, leaving water supply generally to the localities. Id. 
 38. Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse 
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 722 (2006), citing 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999) (dismissing federal Fair Labor Standards Act claim 
against the state of Maine, with the Supreme Court finding that Congress could not use its Article 
I powers to abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity in private suits filed in state courts). 
 39. Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member States’ Autonomy in the European Union: Some 
Cautionary Tales from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1612, n.147, citing Edward T. 
Swaine, Subsidiarity and Self-Interest: Federalism at the European Court of Justice, 47 HARV. 
INT’L. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2000).  For a more particular look into the States’ rights debate, see ERIN RYAN, 
FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN (2011) and SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, THE FALLACIES 
OF STATES’ RIGHTS (2013). 
 40. Martha A. Field, The Differing Federalisms of Canada and the United States, 55 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 107 (1992); HICKOK, supra note 22, at 3–4.  Field suggests that the shift in 
power occurred because of the structure of the Constitution itself.  Field proffers that the lack of 
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The Supreme Court’s use of the term “joint participants” is also 
instructive.  It notes the shift away from dual federalism, which, over 
time, failed to reflect the reality of state and federal relationships as 
they began to overlap and intersect.41  This brought us to cooperative 
federalism, which is the prevalent model used today.42  For example, 
there are certain environmental issues that implicate both national and 
local concerns, such that they can only be resolved when inter-
jurisdictional authority exists.43  Safe water is a prime example. 
As previously noted, water supply was treated historically as a 
local matter for hundreds of years, but these early localities were not 
exactly effective. 
Many of these systems did not supply safe water and often were the 
source of major disease outbreaks resulting from biological 
contamination of the water. The ability to collect and deliver water 
had outpaced understanding of the health implications of water 
supply and the knowledge to remedy the problem.44 
Nevertheless, the issue of systemic water contamination and 
pollution went unchecked for generations.  A 1969 Community Water 
Supply Survey finally seemed to turn the tide.  It revealed that only 
sixty percent of the public water supply systems surveyed were in 
compliance with applicable standards.45  Nearly forty percent of tap 
water samples exceeded bacteriological or chemical contaminant 
standards.46  “Physical facilities were often inadequate [and] water 
treatment plant operators were inadequately trained.  State programs 
 
enumeration of state powers, coupled with the power of the federal government to interpret its 
enumerated rights, has expanded the rights of the national government to the detriment of the 
several states.  See id. at 108–12 (considering the structural and ideological differences between 
the United States’ and Canada’s constitutions and the impacts of their respective disbursements 
of power). 
 41. SCHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 55–56.  
The term [cooperative federalism] arose out of the recognition that the separation of 
state and national authority assumed in dual federalism did not accurately describe the 
actual interaction of state and national governments. The perceived need for such 
cooperation and the longstanding judicial acquiescence in these cooperative 
arrangements gave the concept strong normative force. Cooperative federalism seeks to 
legitimate in theory the state-federal partnerships that in fact pervade governmental 
operations. Id. at 90. 
 42. Id. at 35–36.  See also id. at 55 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 1990’s jurisprudence, 
which, even though it shifted back to a pre-New Deal philosophy that sought to draw lines 
between state and federal authority, “[g]iven the pervasive concurrence of state and federal 
functions, that notion of dual federalism ha[d] passed irretrievably into history.”) 
 43. Bridget A. Fahey, Consent Procedures and American Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
1561, 1629 n.19 (2015) (citing RYAN, supra note 39, at 146). 
 44. Cox, supra note 32, at 73. 
 45. SCHEBERLE, supra note 1, at 125. 
 46. Cox, supra note 32, at 75. 
Warren - For Publication (Do Not Delete) 3/9/2017  10:29 AM 
Fall 2016] AN AMERICAN RESET 59 
were found commonly to be deficient in inspections and sampling for 
bacteriological analysis.”47 
Despite ideological divides, general agreement began to emerge 
that the environmental challenges had reached a breaking point and 
necessitated the creation of a federal environment policy.48  The 1970’s 
heralded an era that scholars describe as the “Decade of the 
Environment,”49 an age of federal activism,50 and “a new experiment in 
cooperative federalism in the field of environmental law.”51 
The first step involved enacting the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969,52 which President Nixon signed into law on January 
1, as his first official act of 1970.53  Then, during the 1970 State of the 
Union address, President Nixon announced his plans to further 
strengthen federal water and air pollution laws.  “It was in this 
atmosphere of intense concern for environmental issues that President 
Nixon . . . proposed making ‘the 1970s a historic period when, by 
conscious choice, [we] transform our land into what we want it to 
become.’”54 The president “continued this activist theme”55 by 
announcing a 37-point action plan to strengthen federal programs 
addressing water and air pollution.56 
The remainder of 1970 heralded the first Earth Day, the 
enactment of the Clean Air Act,57 and the creation of the EPA.58  
Congress then enacted the Clean Water Act59 in 1972 and the Safe 
Drinking Water Act60 in 1974.61 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Jack Lewis, The Birth of EPA, 11 EPA J. 6, 7 (1985). 
 49. SCHEBERLE, supra note 1, at 5. 
 50. Cox, supra note 32, at 76. 
 51. Glicksman, supra note 38, at 719. 
 52. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (1994)). 
 53. Lewis, supra  note 48, at 7. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012). 
 58. Lewis, supra note 48, at 8. 
 59. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-240, 86 Stat. 47 (1972) (codified as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (1994)). 
 60. 42 U.S.C. § 300f (2012). 
 61. Cox, supra note 32, at 76 n.44.  This behavior would have been protected in the 1980’s by 
what Schapiro suggests was “the most nationalistic period in the rulings of the United States 
Supreme Court. In a series of decisions the Supreme Court disavowed judicial review of 
congressional encroachment on state prerogatives[.]” SCHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 1. 
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C. Statutory Schemes Generally 
In these statutory schemes and others, the federal government has 
pursued three levels of federal-state interactions to implement federal 
environmental programs.  At the far ends of the spectrum are total pre-
emption or direct statutory orders62 and voluntary programs.63  The 
middle ground is one of partial pre-emption, which is rooted in 
cooperative federalism.64 
 
Figure 1 Federal-State Interaction Spectrum65 
In a partial pre-emption case, cooperation occurs as follows:  The 
federal government typically bears primary responsibility for setting 
strong health or technology-based environmental standards.66  The 
pattern “was to write strong statutory language that relied on 
command-and-control regulatory schemes and an initial preemption of 
 
 62. “In this case, congressional architects of environmental laws oblige the states to perform 
certain tasks.”  SCHEBERLE, supra note 1, at 9.  An example is the 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act 
amendments that required states to conduct source water assessments.  If states fail to comply, 
they may face sanctions or be compelled by court order to perform their duties.  The only 
limitation to federal power is that its behavior cannot constitute a constitutional encroachment 
on state sovereignty. Id. at 10 
 63. These are primarily voluntary programs that encourage state participation with the 
“carrot” of federal grant monies.  An example of this type of relationship is the Indoor Radon 
Abatement Act, which provided matching funds for states to promote residential radon testing. 
Id. 
 64. Id. at 8. 
 65. Id. at 9–10. 
 66. Id. at 4. 
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state laws, then permit devolution of responsibility back to state and 
local governments.”67  States are encouraged “to become regulatory 
partners in federal programs,”68 with states and local governments 
serving as “front-line delivery agents.”69  Encouragement can involve 
Congress “threatening to preempt the existing regulations of non-
participating states [or] rewarding participating states with substantial 
monetary subsidies.”70 
Partial pre-emption has become “[t]he prevailing national pattern 
for environmental policy.”71 Unlike total pre-emption,72 it “allows 
states certain flexibility in program design.”73   In this way, partial pre-
emption reflects a cooperative federalism model of layered state and 
federal responsibility.74  Within this framework, “each level of 
government ha[s] a particular role to play . . .  contribut[ing] to the 
common goal of minimizing the degree to which human activities 
threaten harm to health and to valuable natural resources.”75 
D. Safe Drinking Water 
The philosophical shift of the 1970’s prompted the enactment of 
the environmental statutes noted above.76  The most relevant to our 
discussion of Flint Water are the Safe Drinking Water Act and the 
Lead and Copper Rule, with which all public water systems are 
 
 67. Id. at 8. 
 68. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, the New Formalism, and the 
Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight 
of State-Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1602 (2012), citing Evan 
Caminker, The Unitary Executive and State Administration of Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 
1075, 1075 (1997). 
 69. SCHEBERLE, supra note 1, at 5. 
 70. Krotoszynski, supra note 68, at 1602 (citing Caminker, supra note 68, at 1075). 
 71. SCHEBERLE, supra note 1, at 8. 
 72. In the case of complete pre-emption, federal law mandates state performance according 
to federal prescription.  Id. at 9.  “During the 1970s and 1980s federal assertion into previous state 
policy territory reached its zenith with preemptions more than doubling after 1969.  More than 
half of the federal mandates enacted since 1789 were passed in the 1970s and 1980s, and many of 
those preemptions dealt with environmental protection.”  Id. at 5. 
 73. Id. at 9. 
 74. See id. at 1 (“[p]ulling together suggests that state and federal personnel involved in the 
implementation of a program work cooperatively, regarding each other with mutual trust, respect, 
and a shared sense of program goals”). 
 75. Glicksman, supra note 38, at 719–20. 
 76. See SCHEBERLE, supra note 1, at 124 (“taking a hard look at the wide range of public 
water suppliers, the intensely emotional and complicated process of setting standards” has 
“promoted not only environmental groups but also government agencies at all levels to foresee a 
‘crisis’ on the drinking water horizon”). 
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required to comply.77  Flint Water and the EPA’s own data, however, 
reveal that there may be a stark divide between the statutory theory 
and the actual reality of our drinking water scheme. 
1. The Safe Drinking Water Act 
The Safe Drinking Water Act sets Maximum Contaminant Levels 
(“MCLs”) for microorganisms, disinfectants, disinfection byproducts, 
chemicals, and radionuclides.78  MCLs should be distinguished from 
Maximum Contaminant Level Goals (“MCLGs”).  The goals focus on 
the protection of human health.79  However, these goals are not 
enforceable, and they may not even be the same as the MCLs or action 
levels, which are based on the best achievable treatment technology 
and cost.80  For example, the MCLG for lead is zero because of its 
serious health effects.81  On the other hand, the action level for lead is 
.015 mg/L (fifteen parts per billion).82 
Within this cooperative-federalism framework, states may be 
granted primacy with respect to the implementation and enforcement 
of the Safe Drinking Water Act standards so long as certain 
requirements are met, including that the state standards are at least as 
stringent as the federal standards.83  If states elect not to seek primacy, 
the enforcement authority remains with the federal government, but, 
 
 77. Id. at 124, 130. 
 78. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1. 
 79. Memorandum from Committee on Energy and Commerce Majority Staff to 
Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy and the Subcommittee on Health (Apr. 11, 
2016) (explaining “EPA’s primary goals in this effort are to: (1) improve the effectiveness of the 
corrosion control treatment in reducing exposure to lead and copper and (2) require additional 
actions that reduce the public’s exposure to lead and copper when corrosion control treatment 
alone is not effective”) [hereinafter Flint Lessons Memo]. 
 80. See SCHEBERLE, supra note 1, at 129 (“These guidelines are not enforceable by EPA” 
[and] MCL is set as close to the MCLG as ‘feasible.’ The concept of feasibility allows EPA to 
consider technological limitations and cost of treatment.”). 
 81. See FLINT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER, supra note 1, at 27 (“EPA has set the Maximum 
Containment Level Goal (‘MCLG’) at zero for lead because (1) there is no clear threshold for 
some non-carcinogenic lead health effects, (2) a substantial portion of the sensitive population 
already exceeds acceptable blood lead levels, and (3) lead is a probable carcinogen.”). 
 82. 40 C.F.R. § 141.80(b)(1); See Flint Lessons Memo, supra note 79, at 4 (“The LCR also 
establishes a lead “action level” of 15 parts per billion (ppb) based on the 90th percentile level of 
water samples for water drawn from the tap. This means that for a water system to be in 
compliance with the LCR not more than 10 percent of sampled homes located in high risk areas 
for lead contamination (primarily homes with lead pipes and/or lead service lines) may have lead 
levels in their drinking water exceeding 15 ppb.”). 
 83. See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2 (explaining when a “[s]tate has primary enforcement 
responsibility for public water systems”). 
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as of 2016, all states, except Wyoming, have been granted primacy.84  
This makes them responsible for safe drinking water within their 
territory unless the federal government re-assumes authority, which is 
what is supposed to occur if the state program proves inadequate.85 
2. Lead and Copper Rule 
Lead and copper are monitored somewhat differently than other 
contaminants because the contamination usually comes from corrosion 
of the water distribution system itself rather than the water source.86  
Instead of setting numeric MCLs for lead and copper, the Lead and 
Copper Rule uses a system of action levels and mandated treatment 
techniques.87  Treatment techniques include “requirements for 
corrosion control treatment, source water treatment, lead service line 
replacement, and public education. These requirements are triggered, 
in some cases, by lead and copper action levels measured in samples 
collected at consumers’ taps.”88 
The Lead and Copper Rule specifically details how action-level 
samples shall be taken.  Samples shall be “first draw” samples taken 
from the cold water tap in the homes with the highest risk for 
contamination and drawn from water that has been stagnant for at least 
six hours.89  The number of samples required to be taken depends on 
the size of the water system.90  If ten percent of the samples exceed the 
action level, the water supplier is required to take action to limit 
exposure (i.e., the treatment techniques described above, such as 
public education, corrosion control, etc.).91  It is not a violation to 
exceed the action level; it is a violation to fail to take corrective action.92 
 
 84. Safe Drinking Water Act Primacy Agencies, SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE MGMT. 
PROGRAM LEARNING ENVT., http://simple.werf.org/Books/Contents/Asset-Management-for-
Small-Utilities/Appendices/Safe-Drinking-Water-Act-Primacy-Agencies (last visited June 13, 
2016) [hereinafter Safe Drinking Water Act Primacy Agencies]. 
 85. See SCHEBERLE, supra note 1, at 9 (“If approved state programs prove inadequate in 
enforcing national standards, the federal government reserves the right to ‘preempt’ state 
authority and reassume primacy.”). 
 86. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OPTIMAL CORROSION CONTROL TREATMENT EVALUATION 
TECHNICAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRIMACY AGENCIES AND PUBLIC WATER SYSTEMS 8 
(2016), https://www.epa.gov/dwreginfo/optimal-corrosion-control-treatment-evaluation-technica 
l-recommendations [hereinafter EPA 2016 TECHNICAL RECOMMENDATIONS]. 
 87. Id. at 3. 
 88. 40 C.F.R. § 141.80(b) (2014). 
 89. 40 C.F.R. § 141.86(a)(1) (2014); EPA 2016 TECHNICAL RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 
86, at 4. 
 90. EPA 2016 TECHNICAL RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 86, at 4. 
 91. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 141.80(b)–(c). 
 92. Flint Lessons Memo, supra note 79, at 3. 
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3. Safe Water Scheme—Theory vs. Reality 
Critics claim “weak regulatory language and poor implementation 
and enforcement of the Lead and Copper Rule at the federal and state 
levels are at the heart of the [Flint] problem.”93  This could be due, in 
part, “[b]ecause cooperative federalism accepts the general notion of a 
federal-state partnership, but does not provide for rules of 
engagement, the theory provides no resources for monitoring federal-
state relations.”94  In theory, though, the SDWA/LCR model of 
cooperative federalism could provide a doubly redundant public 
protection system—a belt, suspender, and brace – if each actor was 
capable of fulfilling its responsibilities. 
a. In Theory 
Local or regional suppliers, who are required to provide water in 
compliance with federal and state standards, are at the forefront.  If 
they fail, they must notify users and relevant regulatory entities of their 
non-compliance.  As part of its push for SDWA enactment, EPA 
claimed that this notification requirement, in addition to the truly 
American notion of litigation deterrence, creates market incentives 
that protect public health.95 
This [notification] provision, coupled with a citizen suit provision 
will, we believe, make enforcement actions by regulatory agencies 
largely unnecessary. We believe that suppliers of drinking water, 
who in almost all cases charge for their product, could not withstand 
the public pressure if their customers have noticed that they are 
receiving water not in compliance with mandatory health standards. 
The possibility of a citizen suit provides an additional incentive to 
suppliers to maintain compliance with the standards.96 
A 2016 study confirms the EPA’s projections with respect to the 
overall impact of local control, finding that water supply systems that 
are publicly owned by localities tend to be more accountable to the  
 
 
 93. Widespread Lead Crisis, supra note 1, at 4. 
 94. Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 
285 (2005). 
 95. Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Voices Support for Safe Drinking Water Act 
(Mar. 8, 1973) (quoting then EPA Deputy Administrator Robert W. Fri), https://www.epa.gov/ 
aboutepa/epa-voices-support-safe-drinking-water-act [hereinafter March 1973 EPA Press 
Release]. 
 96. Id. 
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residents,97 more affordable,98 more equitable,99 and more 
environmentally sound.100 
Beyond the locality and consumers, the Safe Drinking Water Act 
and Lead and Copper Rule are designed to provide layered oversight 
and accountability:  The state is empowered to monitor and regulate 
the supplier, and the federal government retains authority to intervene 
if the state fails in its responsibilities. 
 
Figure 2 Cooperative Federalism—Safe Drinking Water Model 
Graphically, one can picture the scheme as an inverted pyramid, 
with the locality at the bottom, and the consumers, the state, and the 
EPA representing increasingly powerful layers moving upward.  When 
the system works, the more powerful layers above are in place to 
prevent the escalation of a problem below, and it would take a failure 
at all four levels for significant, long-term harm to occur.101 
 
 97. FOOD & WATER WATCH, supra note 32, at 6. 
 98. Id. at 11. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. As federalism itself is an American invention, an analogy to our favorite pastime—
baseball—might further the explanation of cooperative federalism and the Safe Drinking Water 
Act.  One can imagine a line drive being hit directly toward the pitcher.  In the case of the SDWA, 
the line drive would be a water contamination issue.  The pitcher (a.k.a. the local water supplier) 
would be the first to respond and try to stop the ball.  If the supplier fails, one would expect the 
in-field players (a.k.a. state government) to back up the pitcher and stop the ball.  If both the 
pitcher and the in-field players fail, the outfielders (a.k.a. the EPA) serves as a final line of 
defense.  Like cooperative federalism, each player plays his or her position and relies on the others 
to perform their jobs.  The roles are clearly defined, and each player would be careful not to 
U.S. EPA
Provides technical & financial support.  May 
re-assume primacy if state fails to perform
State Government 
Awarded primacy to implement 
and enforce federal standards  
Consumers
May apply market 
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b. The Reality 
Failure at that rate sounds like a statistical longshot, but it is not.  
Flint Water represents a complete breakdown of this model, with 
failures at each level bringing the weight of the entire structure down 
upon the locality. 
Moreover, the NRDC’s report, which is based on EPA’s official 
violations and enforcement data,102 indicates Flint Water is not an 
isolated case.  It reveals that in 2015, at least 3.9 million Americans 
were exposed to lead in their drinking water at levels that exceeded 
fifteen parts per billion.103 (The words “at least” are chosen purposely 
as EPA acknowledges its data is substantially incomplete.104  For 
example, they do not include Flint.105) 
An additional 18 million Americans were at risk for lead poisoning 
in 2015 because their water systems were not in compliance with the 
Lead and Copper Rule.106  These “violations included failures to 
properly test the water for lead or conditions that could result in lead 
contamination, failures to report contamination to state officials or the 
public, and failures to treat the water appropriately to reduce 
corrosion.” 107  In eighty-eight percent of these cases overall, and in the 
eighty-two percent that involved health-related violations, there was 
no formal state or federal enforcement response.108  Sadly, these 
statistics are not new.109  Scheberle also noted systemic compliance 
 
invade another player’s space (e.g., one would not see an outfielder charge the pitcher’s mound 
to stop a line drive).  And, as in baseball, there is no need for the outfielder to step in if the first-
line defenders are doing their jobs.  However, when the pitcher or the in-field players commit an 
error and miss a ball, it takes a long time for that line drive to make it to the outfield, and, by that 
time, the runner has made it to home.  In the case of a water contamination issue, that can be a 
game-ending run. 
 102. The NRDC used official EPA violation and enforcement records and completed data 
analysis using geographic information system mapping software.  WIDESPREAD LEAD CRISIS, 
supra note 1, at 5. 
 103. Id. 
 104. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROVIDING SAFE DRINKING WATER IN AMERICA: 2013 
NATIONAL PUBLIC WATER SYSTEMS COMPLIANCE REPORT 3 (June 2013), https://www.epa.gov/ 
sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/sdwacom2013.pdf [hereinafter EPA COMPLIANCE 
REPORT]. 
 105. WIDESPREAD LEAD CRISIS, supra note 1, at 14. 
 106. Id. at 5. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 6.  Scheberle also noted in 2004 the high number of violations, which she attributed 
to the lack of capacity of small providers.  SCHEBERLE, supra note 1, at 128.  Given the size of the 
suppliers, she further suggested that informal action, rather than formal action or fines, would be 
pursued as the most effective mode of obtaining compliance.  Id. 
 109. This is not the first time where there has been a disconnect between the theory and the 
reality of the assertion of federal authority.  One previous example is the American Civil War and 
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failures in her 2004 work.110  So what do these facts say about the 
capacity of our cooperative federalism model and the level of 
confidence it inspires? 
III. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AT A CROSSROADS 
The premise of this paper is that the cooperative federalism model 
we rely upon for safe water is becoming increasingly inadequate for the 
reality of twenty-first century water delivery.  It places the already 
heavy and ever-increasing burden on the least powerful and capable 
actor—the water supplier.111  This is problematic because when “the 
scope of an environmental harm does not match the regulator’s 
jurisdiction, the cost-benefit calculus will be skewed and either too 
little or too much environmental protection will be provided.”112  In 
this case, it is the former. 
A. The Heavy Burden of Providing Safe Water in the Twenty-First 
Century 
The burden of providing safe water is great.  In addition to 
meeting all of the technical requirements of the federal safe water 
scheme, which have been characterized as “overwhelming,”113 
 
Reconstruction.  The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments changed drastically the 
states’ power over civil rights, election laws, and some aspects of criminal law, making them an 
area of shared state and federal responsibility, SCHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 36.  And yet, 
The federal government retreated from its obligations to supervise the areas of joint 
authority. After the Compromise of 1877, national troops withdrew from the former 
Confederate states, and national attention largely turned elsewhere.  In the ironically 
named Civil Rights Cases in 1883, the Supreme Court restricted the authority of 
Congress to guarantee equal rights. In the infamous case of Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896, 
the Court held that the system of pervasive, legally enforced racial segregation in the 
South did not violate the constitutional command of equal protection of law.  Id. 
 110. See SCHEBERLE, supra note 1, at 139–40 (“State officials are reluctant to adopt strong 
compliance postures toward systems that lack the ability to add new treatment technologies or 
monitoring staff.  Thus, not only were PWS systems failing to comply but states also were failing 
to report these violations to EPA or to take action to address the problem.”). 
 111. This power “mismatch” has been noted before, as has its consequences.  Even those 
advocating local water rights in the 1970’s recognized the mismatch might occur and necessitate 
more powerful entity involvement “where there is undue political influence at local levels, where 
there is sufficient interjurisdictional pollution, and where technological considerations give 
substantially greater efficiency to larger jurisdictions in either providing technical information or 
in carrying out control responsibilities.” See Richard Zerbe, Optimal Environmental Jurisdictions, 
4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 193, 245 (1974); See also Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in 
Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130 (2005); Engel, supra note 31, at 161. 
 112. Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 587 
(1996). 
 113. SCHEBERLE, supra note 1, at 136. 
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particularly in the face of inadequate federal funding,114 other 
challenges loom large. 
1. Infrastructure 
The federal government’s position is that “localities are primarily 
responsible for providing water infrastructure services.”115  Yet, 
localities are ill-equipped to address the challenge.  Infrastructure in 
the United States is “at the end of its useful life.”116  (In fact, it may 
already be beyond it, but the underreporting of lead contamination 
levels117 and lack of complete EPA violations data118 may be masking 
the depth of the problem.)  Nevertheless, in 2013, the American 
Society of Civil Engineers119 graded our nation’s drinking water 
infrastructure a “D,” noting that it is frequently more than 100 years 
old.120  Michigan’s governor noted much the same when delivering his 
Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Presentation.121  And the Council of State 
Governments (“Council”)122 reports that 6.5 million lead service lines 
 
 114. Id. at 140, 143. 
 115. CLAUDIA COPELAND, ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42467, LEGISLATIVE 
OPTIONS FOR FINANCING WATER INFRASTRUCTURE 1 (2016) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE 
FINANCING OPTIONS]. 
 116. The Major Changes of a Deteriorating Infrastructure in the United States, GROWING 
BLUE Apr. 4, 2011, http://growingblue.com/case-studies/the-major-challenge-of-a-deteriorating-
infrastructure-in-the-united-states/; WIDESPREAD LEAD CRISIS, supra note 1, at 6. 
 117. See generally WIDESPREAD LEAD CRISIS, supra note 1, at 5; Sara Gannim, 5,300 U.S. 
Water Systems Are in Violation of Lead Rules, CNN Jun. 29, 2016, 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/28/us/epa-lead-in-u-s-water-systems/; Oliver Milman & Jessica 
Glenza, At Least 33 Cities Used Water Testing ‘Cheats’ over Lead Concerns, THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 
2, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/jun/02/lead-water-testing-cheats-chica 
go-boston-philadelphia?utm_source=esp&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=GU+Today+ 
USA+-+morning+briefing+2016&utm_term=175331&subid=11404366&CMP=ema_a-morning-
briefing_b-morning-briefing_c-US_d-1. 
 118. EPA COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 104. 
 119. The ASCE is the oldest engineering society in the United States.  Founded in 1852, it 
now has more than 150,000 members from 177 countries.  About Us, AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, 
http://www.asce.org/about_asce/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2016). 
 120. AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, 2013 REPORT CARD FOR AMERICA’S INFRASTRUCTURE—
DRINKING WATER 17 (2013), http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/water-infrastructure/. 
 121. RICK SNYDER & JOHN ROBERTS, WE ARE ONE MICHIGAN, GOVERNOR RICK 
SNYDER’S FY 2017 BUDGET PRESENTATION (slide at 15) (2016), http://www.michigan.gov/doc 
uments/budget/FY17_Exec_Budget_Presentation_514108_7.pdf  [hereinafter FY 2017 BUDGET 
PRESENTATION]. 
 122. The CSG was founded in 1933 and is a not-for-profit organization.  It has created regional 
fora for American states and territories and Canadian provinces to share information and develop 
state policy.  COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’TS, http://www.csg.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2016). It 
also publishes annually The Book of the States, which provides data, shares policy initiatives, and 
reports on current affairs for state leaders of all three branches of government. Book of the States, 
COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’TS, http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/category/content-type/content-
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are in use.123 
Both the Council and American Water Works Association124 
estimate it will cost 1 trillion dollars to replace these lines and maintain 
new growth over the next twenty-five years.125  The EPA’s estimate is 
$655 billion over a twenty-year period.126  (This figure is lower because 
EPA only considers projects that currently are eligible for federal 
funding.127) “Whether the estimates made by states and EPA 
understate or overstate capital needs, communities face formidable 
challenges in providing adequate and reliable water infrastructure 
services.”128  The estimated spending needs for Michigan’s drinking 
water infrastructure alone are $13.8 billion over the next twenty years, 
with California’s projection topping the list at $44.5 billion.129 
To put these numbers in perspective, in 2014, all fifty U.S. states 
combined spent a total of $4.7 billion on capital expenditures for the 
environment generally, which includes new construction, 
infrastructure, major repairs, land purchases, and other items.130  
Moreover, these figures represent a reduction in spending131 that is 
likely to continue. 
In fiscal 2016, for the first time, general fund spending and revenue 
levels in the aggregate are estimated to have finally surpassed their 
pre-recession peaks, after adjusting for inflation. However, many 
individual states still report general fund expenditures and revenues 
below their fiscal 2008 levels in real terms. Looking ahead, states 
 
type/book-states (last visited Nov. 13, 2016). From 2012-2016, its presidents, all state governors, 
have been Republicans and Democrats.  For the past five years, its chairs have all been 
Republicans.  Id. 
 123. Liz Edmondson, The State of America’s Aging Drinking Water Infrastructure, COUNCIL 
OF ST. GOV’TS: LIZ EDMONDSON’S BLOG (Feb. 5, 2016, 3:41 PM), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org 
/kc/content/state-americas-aging-drinking-water-infrastructure. 
 124. The AAWA was established in 1881 and is the “largest nonprofit, scientific and 
educational association dedicated to managing and treating water.” About Us, AM. WATER 
WORKS ASS’N, http://www.awwa.org/about-us.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2016). 
 125. Edmondson, supra note 123. 
 126. LEGISLATIVE FINANCING OPTIONS, supra note 115, at 1. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Edmondson, supra note 123. 
 130. NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT; 
EXAMINING FISCAL 2013–2015 STATE SPENDING 81, 86 (2015) [hereinafter STATE 
EXPENDITURE REPORT]. 
 131. See id. (“State capital funding for environmental purposes in fiscal 2014 totaled $4.7 
billion, 5.0 percent of total capital spending and a 0.5 percent decrease from fiscal 2013.  
Environmental capital expenditures are estimated to decrease by 4.9 percent in fiscal 2015.”). The 
areas that make up the remaining 95 percent are Higher Education, Corrections, Transportation, 
Housing, and an “Other” category.  Id. at 80. 
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across the country continue to face budgetary challenges, including: 
. . . a pent-up need for infrastructure investment[.]132 
2. Lack of Political Will 
A recent Congressional Research Service report reiterates this 
“pent-up” need, indicating that “interest in other financing options 
continues, in part due to long-standing concerns with the costs to repair 
aging and deteriorated U.S. infrastructure generally, and also in 
response to events in individual regions and cities, such as Flint, MI.”133    
The report goes on to note: 
Consensus exists among many stakeholders . . . on the need for more 
investment in water infrastructure. There is no consensus supporting 
a preferred option or policy. . . . Some of the options discussed in this 
report may be helpful, but there is no single method that will address 
needs fully or close the financing gap completely.134 
With these staggering cost estimates and difficult policy choices, it 
is perhaps not surprising that America is not moving ahead full steam 
with much-needed projects.  In these economic times, it is unclear who 
has the financial capacity to undertake the challenge, although it is 
clear it is not the locality.  In addition, in this very long and contentious 
election cycle, the candidates’ positions are divided.135   While this gives 
voters a choice, it indicates nothing is likely to happen in the near 
future. 
3. Inaccurate or Incomplete Reporting Suggests Systemic 
Disrespect for the Statutory Scheme 
This inaction, while perhaps politically understandable, does leave 
all cities at risk, even those serviced by the most forthright and earnest 
water suppliers.  And here is where an already grim picture gets worse, 
as there is reason to believe that not all suppliers meet this description.  
As noted above, even with incomplete data, the NRDC study reveals 
a startling number of violations.136 
The Guardian recently published a report with similar findings, 
 
 132. NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, SUMMARY: SPRING 2016 FISCAL SURVEY 
OF STATES 5 (2016). 
 133. LEGISLATIVE FINANCING OPTIONS, supra note 115, at Summary. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Gabrielle Marangell, Presidential Politics: Water Supply and Contamination, EARTH 
INST., COLUM. UNIV. (June 29, 2016), http://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2016/06/29/presidential-polit 
ics-water-supply-and-contamination/. 
 136. See WIDESPREAD LEAD CRISIS, supra note 1, at 3 (introducing the underreporting 
problems but noting that “the widespread violations evidenced by the EPA’s data and the maps 
contained in this report reflect only a subset of a serious and likely much bigger lead problem”). 
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reporting that major U.S. cities have used in the past decade water 
sampling “cheats” that are likely to distort lead contamination 
results.137  This report sought to study lead sample collection techniques 
in eighty-one of the largest cities east of the Mississippi.138  It found that 
thirty-three of the forty-three cities that  reported their techniques, 
including Boston, Chicago, and Philadelphia, had violated EPA 
sampling protocols by flushing stagnant water from pipes before 
collecting samples, removing aerators from the tips of the faucets, or 
collecting the samples slowly to reduce the flow of the water through 
the pipes.139  Another statewide practice employed in Michigan and 
New Hampshire was to take samples early so there would be sufficient 
time to collect additional samples if the originals exceeded federal lead 
limits.140  The Guardian echoes the Flint Taskforce’s characterization 
of EPA, reporting that the EPA has been slow to respond to the 
sampling issue and has left these “cheats” at the local and state levels 
largely unchecked for years.141 
4. Security of Resources 
a. Using Challenged Water Sources 
Beyond infrastructure, localities in the future also may need to 
turn to more challenged water sources.142  Flint’s shift to the corrosive 
Flint River was related, at least in part, to its inability to pay the 
increased cost of Detroit water.143  In addition to financial 
considerations, localities may need to shift to new water sources when 
an existing source lacks capacity, which might occur in cases of drought, 
expanding populations, and shifts from private water sources.  For 
example, from 2007-2014, localities saw a ten percent increase in the 
number of people they serviced, with the addition of 24 million new 
people in just that short period of time.144  At the same time, “many of 
 
 137. Milman & Glenza, supra note 117. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. “As worldwide populations grow and become more affluent, the demand for food and 
water rises. At the same time, climate variability and change are making it difficult to provide 
water where and when it is needed. Floods destroy communities in one part of the world, while 
in another people trek miles every day just to get enough water to survive. Water scarcity is a 
pervasive problem and is one of the most difficult challenges we face in the 21st century.”  Water, 
THE EARTH INST., http://www.earth.columbia.edu/articles/view/2125 (last visited Sept. 30, 2016). 
 143. See infra Section IV.A.2 c–d. 
 144. FOOD & WATER WATCH, supra note 32, at 3, 5. 
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the states that have projected population growth increases also have 
higher per capita water use and can expect increased competition for 
water resources.”145  Contamination of existing sources is another 
reason localities may seek alternative water sources.146 
In any of these circumstances, however, a basic truth may be that 
the locality was already using the best water source available, which 
means that if localities are required to identify alternative sources, their 
options may be limited.  They may be forced to shift to sources that 
represent more of a financial or technical challenge or more of a 
danger.  This, in turn, places an increased burden on the locality. 
b. Terrorism 
It goes without saying that the security of our water supply is a 
vital national security interest.  Before September 11, 2001, there were 
“few political discussions about protecting America’s public water 
supplies from terrorist attacks.  But since September 11, the discussions 
have moved front and center in many debates about environmental 
laws, including the Safe Drinking Water Act.”147  Despite that critical 
turning point in 2001, as of 2002, no federal funds were available to 
help systems that served fewer than 100,000 people.148  As of 2004, only 
twenty-eight percent of those surveyed felt that their state system was 
secure from attack.149  Undoubtedly these discussions have become 
even more intense in recent years.  The question remains whether 
localities are capable of defending against such threats.  Those that are 
struggling to meet daily needs are unlikely to have longer-term 
strategies. 
B. The Least Powerful Actor—The Water Supplier 
These increasingly heavy burdens are placed on the least powerful 
actor—the water supplier.  Of all the actors in the cooperative 
federalism scheme, the supplier is the least funded and the least 
 
 145. Our Water, Tomorrow & Beyond, Communities Face Challenges, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY & WATERSENSE, https://www3.epa.gov/watersense/our_water/tomorrow_beyond.html 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2016). 
 146. See generally Marangell, supra note 135 (discussing contamination of water in America); 
See also Rochelle Riley, A Long Friendship Put Spotlight on Flint Water Crisis, DET. FREE PRESS 
(Apr. 29, 2016, 7:13PM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/columnists/rochelle-riley/2016/02/06/l 
ong-friendship-put-spotlight-flint-water-crisis/79774098/. (“Usually the reason you change your 
source water is because your original source is contaminated or it’s running out . . .. ”). 
 147. SCHEBERLE, supra note 1, at xvi. 
 148. Id. at 139. 
 149. Id. at 143. 
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imbued with official status.  As a consequence, it cannot “go it alone,” 
but it also cannot compel financial, technical, and political support 
from state and federal actors, even when such assistance may be 
desperately needed. 
Moreover, localities suffer when the perceived spheres of state 
and federal responsibility become more distinct and uncooperative, as 
reflected by the March 2016 Congressional testimony of Governor 
Snyder and EPA Administrator Gena McCarthy.150  Although 
cooperative federalism works in the context of voluntary interaction, 
“it does little to sort out the conflicts that may arise in that 
relationship,”151 when it becomes competitive or confrontational.  This 
makes it even more difficult for the locality to obtain needed 
assistance. 
1. Water Supplier May Lack Capacity 
First, most water supply systems are small and local.  As noted 
above, today there are approximately 155,000 public water systems152 
in the United States that service almost ninety percent of the 
population.153  Of those that are community water systems, roughly 
eighty-four percent are locally owned,154 and that number is increasing 
as part of a nationwide trend of localities purchasing small, privately-
owned systems.155 
 
 150. See generally Transcript of March 17, 2016 Meeting of the House Oversight & 
Governmental Reform Committee, FLINT WATER COMMITTEE, http://www.flintwatercommittee. 
com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/FLINT-HEARING-OF-MARCH-17-FINAL-with-cover-shee 
t.pdf.  Watching this testimony was the inspiration for this article.  Both the state and federal 
governments were blaming each other for the crisis, and there was a kernel of truth to what they 
both were saying.  The idea struck like a flash—the problem, at its core, is an issue of federalism. 
 151. SCHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 90. 
 152. A public water system, as defined, provides water for human consumption to at least 
twenty-five people or fifteen service connections.  Building the Capacity of Drinking Water 
Systems, Learn About Small Drinking Water Systems, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https:// 
www.epa.gov/dwcapacity/learn-about-small-drinking-water-systems (last visited Sept. 29, 2016) 
[hereinafter EPA – Building Capacity]. 
 153. Drinking Water Requirements, supra note 34.  The EPA separates these public systems 
into three categories: (1) a community water system, which is a public water system that supplies 
water to the same population year-round; (2) a non-transient non-community water system, which 
is a public water system that regularly supplies water to at least 25 of the same people at least six 
months per year (e.g., schools, factories, office buildings, and hospitals that have their own water 
systems); and (3) a transient non-community water system, which is a public water system that 
provides water to people who do not remain for long periods of time (e.g., gas stations and 
campgrounds).  Id.  As demonstrated by these definitions, the term “public water system” refers 
to the people who are serviced by the system rather than the entity that owns the system. 
 154. FOOD & WATER WATCH, supra note 32, at 4. 
 155. Id. at 2, 4.  It should be noted that about half of the systems in the United States are 
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There are many benefits to locally owned public water supply 
systems.156  They tend to be more accountable to the residents,157 more 
affordable,158 more equitable,159 and more environmentally sound.160 
There also are drawbacks, especially for small systems, in terms of 
capacity.  Water systems range in size, serving anywhere from a few 
dozen to a few million taps,161 although the clear majority are 
considered small because of the number of people they serve.162  The 
diversity of the systems has “staggering implications for implementing 
the law.  Small systems lack technical capacity and resources to 
comply.”163  They operate on miniscule budgets.  The smallest 
providers, who also tend to be the systems out of compliance, report 
zero total water revenues or very low revenues.164  They also lack a tax 
base to repay loans.165  Along these lines, EPA notes that “small water 
systems can face unique financial and operational challenges in 
consistently providing drinking water that meets EPA standards and 
requirements.”166 
Although other water suppliers may have more capacity, they are 
subject to a lack of federal and state funding.  Although the Safe 
Drinking Water Act authorizes the federal government to provide 
states with up to seventy-five percent of the funds needed to administer 
their programs, funding has never reached that level.167  In the 1980’s 
and 1990’s, federal funding covered only about thirty-five percent of 
the states’ program costs168 and the numbers have gone downhill from 
 
privately owned.  Although public systems service a clear majority of the population, “only about 
half of U.S. water systems are publicly owned. The reason is that there are many small private 
systems serving subdivisions and other small communities, while nearly every large city owns its 
own water system and serves a much larger population.”  Id. at 5. 
 156. In terms of this report, the authors are comparing public and private, for-profit systems.  
See generally id. (finding public ownership of water systems a more affordable option for water 
service). Again, the EPA’s characterization of “public water systems” refers to serving the public, 
and these systems can be both publicly and privately owned. 
 157. Id. at 6, 11. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 7. 
 160. Id. 
 161. SCHEBERLE, supra note 1, at 124. 
 162. See EPA – Building Capacity, supra note 152.  More than 97 percent of these systems 
service less than 10,000 people.  Id. 
 163. SCHEBERLE, supra note 1, at 127. 
 164. Id. at 128. 
 165. See LEGISLATIVE FINANCING OPTIONS, supra note 115, at 1. 
 166. EPA – Building Capacity, supra note 152. 
 167. See SCHEBERLE, supra note 1, at 126. 
 168. See id. 
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there.  (And it should be noted that these are federal funds to the states, 
who then distribute funds to localities.) 
Federal capitalization grants [or State Revolving Funds, which are 
the most prominent source of federal funding to the states] are 
entirely subject to appropriations, which generally have been flat or 
declining for more than a decade[.] The FY2009 exception to this 
trend reflects temporary funding under the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009)]. The President’s FY2016 budget request 
for capitalization grants for the [Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking 
Water Act] SRF (State Revolving Funds) programs was 2.3 percent 
below the $2.36 billion total appropriated in FY2015. Similarly, the 
FY2017 request for the two programs totals $2.0 billion and is nearly 
13 percent below the FY2016-appropriated amount.169 
Along these lines, it has been argued that “[t]he current 
congressional funding of $2.37 billion per year for drinking water and 
clean water infrastructure funds is paltry at best and should at least be 
restored to the approximately $8 billion per year stipulated under the 
2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.”170 
With respect to state funding, as noted above, states generally 
have been reducing capital expenditures related to the environment, 
with a 5.4 percent decrease from 2013-2015.171 
2. Localities Cannot Compel Needed Assistance 
Localities are the least powerful in terms of generating state and 
federal assistance.  For example, there is no coordinated action being 
taken to address our infrastructure problem.172   Localities on the front 
line have the most incentive to facilitate coordinated action but are 
powerless to compel the action.  They also lack the capacity to change 
the lack of federal and state funding noted above.   A supplier is at the 
mercy of state and federal officials when it comes to technical guidance  
 
 
 169. LEGISLATIVE FINANCING OPTIONS, supra note 115, at 5 (emphasis added).  In addition 
to the reduction in federal funds, smaller communities also criticize the SRF programs, which 
treat the funds as loans rather than grants.  Smaller or beleaguered communities tend not to have 
the tax base to support loan repayment.  Id. at 4. 
 170. WIDESPREAD LEAD CRISIS, supra note 1, at 6.  This is not to say that the federal 
government does not fund the states, as federal funding makes up more than thirty percent of 
states’ annual revenue, but the vast majority of federal funding is allocated to health care. STATE 
EXPENDITURE REPORT, supra note 147, at 1; See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, Fiscal 50: State 
Trends and Analysis, Federal Share of State Revenue, PEWTRUSTS.ORG http://www.pewtrusts.org 
/en/multimedia/data-visualizations/2014/fiscal-50#ind1 (last updated Jul. 28, 2016).  The next 
highest pool of federal funds is devoted to education.  As one can see, there are no easy options. 
 171. STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT, supra note 130, at 81, 86. 
 172. See Edmondson, supra note 123. 
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and support.  The locality can request guidance but lacks a mechanism 
to require others to provide it. 
C. State as a Supplier & Enforcer 
Although uncommon, one final point to consider in terms of a 
structural flaw in the cooperative federalism model is that the state may 
become too heavily involved in local decisions, which impairs its ability 
to regulate and enforce the law.  This could happen if the locality lacks 
appropriate funds.  For example, state-appointed emergency managers 
in Flint made the critical decisions that led to the water crisis.173  In a 
sense, the state appointees became the local supplier, so the state was 
essentially monitoring itself.  With respect to the nineteen states and 
the District of Columbia who have emergency manager laws174 or states 
that may become heavily embroiled in local water supply issues for 
other reasons, one must recognize that this altered position undercuts 
a key component of the cooperative federalism model.  This can 
become a case of the fox guarding his own hen house. 
IV. FLINT WATER—A CASE STUDY OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM 
This section will describe the base facts of Flint Water and place 
them into a historical and political context.  In this way, the ongoing 
challenges of our cooperative federalism model are revealed, as Flint 
Water is not just an isolated event.  It is an outward manifestation of 
the ongoing challenges facing local, state, and federal government 
generally. 
A. The City of Flint 
As noted above, our nation relies increasingly on local public 
water supply systems, and there are many benefits to this model in 
terms of accountability, etc.  However, Flint’s significant economic and 
social challenges demonstrate an underlying problem with cooperative 
federalism, which places the greatest responsibility on what is 
sometimes the least capable actor—the locality. 
Since Flint’s conditions are extreme, it might be tempting to 
conclude that they cannot speak for a more systemic problem that 
localities face in our cooperative federalism model.  However, rather 
 
 173. See FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 1; Jeremy C.F. Lin, Jean Rutter, & Haeyoun 
Park, Events That Led to Flint’s Water Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2016. 
 174. Liz Edmondson, Emergency Manager Laws in the States, COUNCIL OF ST. GOV’TS: LIZ 
EDMONDSON’S BLOG (Jan. 29, 2016, 9:32 AM), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/emerg 
ency-manager-laws-states-0. 
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than saying Flint is an isolated case, one might wonder why, when it so 
obvious that a locality is struggling, would any model look to that 
locality as a viable supplier or not at least verify its reports, which were 
contradicted by the facts on the ground.  This is the dilemma. 
1.  The Mechanics of the Water Crisis 
Flint residents, among some of the most economically 
disadvantaged people in the United States,175 pay the highest water 
rates in the United States.176  Here is the unbelievable story of what 
they receive in exchange. 
In April 2014, Flint discontinued its 49-year-old practice of 
purchasing safe water from the Detroit Water and Sewerage 
Department (“DWSD” or “Detroit”).177  As an alternative, it began to 
supply water to its citizens using the highly corrosive Flint River as its 
water source, which had been rejected repeatedly in the past as an 
unacceptable source.178  Flint also began to use its own Water 
Treatment Plant, which had stopped being used on an on-going basis 
in 1965, 179 when Flint converted to Detroit water.180 
As noted above, Flint did not use corrosion-control measures to 
prevent contaminants from leaching from its aging lead pipes into the 
water,181 even though Flint River water was nineteen times more 
 
 175. FOOD & WATER WATCH, supra note 32, at 10. 
 176. Id. 
 177. There was a small ceremony at the treatment plant when the Detroit pipeline was 
officially powered down.  In what now seems to be a gruesome act of foreshadowing, the 
officials on hand raised glasses of water in celebration, and the now-indicted MDEQ district 
supervisor, Steve Busch, declared: “Individuals shouldn’t notice any difference.”  The mayor 
is quoted to have said, “There have been a lot of questions from our customers because this 
is such a major change.  When the treated river water starts being pumped into the system, 
we move from plan to reality. The water quality speaks for itself.”  Dominic Adams, Closing 
the Valve on History: Flint Cuts Water Flow from Detroit After Nearly 50 Years, MLIVE, 
http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2014/04/closing_the_valve_on_history_f.html (last 
updated Jan. 17, 2015, 10:13 AM). 
 178. See FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, app. at 1 (summarizing 2004 study noting Flint 
River potential for contamination and 2006 study suggesting Flint River’s lack of capacity for 
long-term use). 
 179. During this period, the treatment plant was tested four times a year and updated, as 
necessary, but only so that it could be maintained as an emergency back-up system.  Id. at app. 
15. 
 180. Id.  It should be noted that the Taskforce states that Flint and Detroit entered into the 
water contract in 1967.  Other sources note the date as 1965.  See Letter from Sue McCormick, 
Director, City of Detroit Water and Sewerage Department, to Inez Brown, Clerk, City of Flint, 
re: Termination of Contract for the Provision of Water Services by the City of Detroit, Water and 
Sewerage Department (Apr. 17, 2013) [hereinafter Termination Letter]. 
 181. FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at app. 1. 
Warren - For Publication (Do Not Delete) 3/9/2017  10:29 AM 
78 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXVII:51 
corrosive than Detroit water.182  The Michigan Department of 
Environmental Quality treated the Flint treatment plant, which was 
built in 1952,183 as a “new” system.184  This (mis)categorization 
exempted Flint from immediately implementing corrosion control 
techniques.  Instead, Flint began two six-month monitoring periods, at 
the end of which it could implement corrosion control if needed.185 
For most, the shift to the Flint River was obviously ill advised 
before it occurred in April 2014.186  For those few who lacked foresight, 
however, the problems became glaringly apparent almost immediately 
afterward.  Flint was struggling to comply with its legal obligations to 
provide safe drinking water. 
a.   Summary Timeline 
The facts are detailed in the Flint Taskforce’s Final Report,187 but 
here are some key findings: 
 Residents first began to complain about the water’s odor, 
taste, and appearance.188 
 In August 2014, Flint issued a boil-water advisory because 
of E-coli contamination in the water.189 
 October 2014 was a critical time for several reasons. 
o General Motors discontinued use of Flint water at 
its Flint manufacturing facility because the water 
was damaging GM’s automotive parts.190 
o The Genesee County Health Department reported 
to Flint Public Works that there had been an 
increase in cases of Legionellosis since April 2014, 
with a possible connection to the switch to the Flint 
River.191 
o Top aides and advisors to Governor Snyder 
contacted the Flint emergency manager to discuss 
 
 182. Siddharthe Roy, Test Update: Flint River Water 19x More Corrosive than Detroit Water 
for Lead Solder; Now What?, FLINT WATER STUDIES (Sep. 11, 2015), http://flintwaterstudy.org/20 
15/09/test-update-flint-river-water-19x-more-corrosive-than-detroit-water-for-lead-solder-now-
what/. 
 183. Water Treatment Plant, CITY OF FLINT https://www.cityofflint.com/public-works/utilities 
water/water-treatment-plant/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2016). 
 184. Flint Lessons Memo, supra note 79, at 2. 
 185. FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at app. 16; Flint Lessons Memo, supra note 79, at 2. 
 186. FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at app. 16. 
 187. See generally id. at app. (summarizing event timeline). 
 188. Id. at app. 16. 
 189. Id. at app. 17. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
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switching back to Detroit water.  The emergency 
manager indicated that Flint’s water problems 
could be resolved and converting back to Detroit 
water was cost prohibitive. 192 
 In December 2014, the first six-month period of Lead and 
Copper Rule monitoring ended.  Flint water samples 
exceeded the lead action level, which triggered the need to 
implement corrosion control measures.193 The state did not 
inform Flint of this requirement.194 
 By January 2015, state offices in Flint were equipped with 
water coolers, and employees were given the option of using 
bottled water in their offices and providing bottled water to 
visitors.195 
 In March 2015, the Flint City Council voted seven to one to 
return to the Detroit water system.  This vote was non-
binding since the city was under emergency management.196 
 At the same time, non-state sourced testing revealed lead in 
the water.  As noted, the State of Michigan and Flint water 
officials were purposefully skewing water sampling practices 
and results to conceal the presence of lead.  Their March 
2015 report indicated a lead level of six parts per billion.197  
However, testing completed by a private citizen, LeeAnne 
Walters, and the EPA revealed something different.  A 
sample drawn from Walters’ home in February 2015 was 104 
parts per billion;198 subsequent samples revealed 397 parts 
per billion in March 2015199 and 2,429 parts per billion in 
May 2015.200 
 In June 2015, EPA official Del Toral published a report 
noting concerns with lead levels in Flint.201  In fact, it was 
Del Toral who put Walters in contact with Professor Mark 
Edwards.202 
 In August 2015, Professor Mark Edwards and his team 
revealed that Flint’s water was well beyond the federal 
action level of fifteen parts per billion.203  Random samples 
 
 192. Id. at app. 17–18. 
 193. Id. at app. 18. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at app. 11. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at app. 18. 
 199. Id. at app. 10. 
 200. Id. at app. 12. 
 201. Id. at app. 13. 
 202. Id. at app. 12. 
 203. The team stresses that it is using volunteer participants for the study.  The study is not an 
official Lead and Copper Rule study, which requires a certain number of homes to have lead pipes 
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of 162 homes revealed the ninetieth percentile of samples to 
be 28.7 parts per billion.204  This finding prompted the team 
to conclude that Flint was experiencing a system-wide 
contamination event.205  Another metric used to evaluate 
lead levels in Flint was to test the percentage of samples that 
had no detectable lead levels.  In July 2015, only nine 
percent of the samples had no detectible lead levels.206 
b. Health Implications 
The ramifications of this toxic water are devastating. 
i. Lead Exposure 
Lead is a possible carcinogen207 that “can affect almost every organ 
and system in your body.  Children six years old and younger are most 
susceptible to the effects of lead.”208  “Even at very low levels once 
considered safe, lead can cause serious, irreversible damage to the 
developing brains and nervous systems of babies and young 
children.”209  Lead poisoning in these children can have long-term 
health and behavioral consequences, including lower IQ, hyperactivity, 
slowed growth, hearing problems, and anemia.  It can even cause 
seizures, coma, and death in rare cases.210 
Sadly, the EPA acknowledges that nation-wide “a substantial 
portion of the sensitive population already exceeds acceptable blood 
lead levels.”211  With respect to Flint, Governor Snyder said that we 
“must assume all children were exposed” to lead.212 
 
 
 
and to focus on high risk homes. FLINT WATER STUDY, August 11, 2016 Press Conference, Flint 
Residents Sampling Aug. 2015-July 2016 and Presentation Slides, http://flintwaterstudy.org/ 
[hereinafter WATER STUDY]. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at slide 9.  Thankfully the numbers are coming down.  In March 2016, the 90th 
percentile was 22.5 parts per billion.  Id. at slide 11.  In July 2016, the 90th percentile was 13.9—
finally under the action level.  Id. at slide 14. 
 206. Id. at slide 15. 
 207. FLINT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER, supra note 1, at ¶ 27. 
 208. Learn About Lead, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,  https://www.epa.gov/lead/learn-about-
lead#effects  (last visited Sept. 30, 2016) [hereinafter Learn About Lead]. 
 209. WIDESPREAD LEAD CRISIS, supra note 1, at 3 (citing Advisory Committee on Childhood 
Lead Poisoning Prevention, Low Level Lead Exposure Harms Children: A Renewed Call for 
Primary Prevention, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (2012), http://www.cdc. 
gov/nceh/lead/acclpp/final_document_030712.pdf). 
 210. Learn About Lead, supra note 208. 
 211. FLINT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER, supra note 1, at ¶ 27. 
 212. FY 2017 BUDGET PRESENTATION, supra note 121, at slide 4. 
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With respect to adults, pregnant women should take care, as 
fetuses are especially vulnerable to lead poisoning.213  Lead exposure 
in adults also can cause cardiovascular effects, increased blood 
pressure and incidence of hypertension, decreased kidney function, 
and reproductive problems (in both men and women).214 
ii. Cases of Legionnaire’s Disease (Including Deaths) 
Medical data215 collected also reveals a sharp increase in the 
number of cases of Legionnaire’s Disease after Flint converted to the 
Flint River in April 2014, particularly in the summer of 2014 and 
2015.216  “Infections caused by Legionella bacteria can cause relatively 
mild illness in generally healthy adults but can cause life-threatening 
illness and even death in elderly and immune-compromised 
patients.”217  From 2010 to 2013, the number of reported cases of 
Legionnaire’s Disease in the county averaged nine point five.  The 
number of reported cases jumped to forty-two in 2014 and forty-five in 
2015, with a total of nine deaths.218  “This was described by an expert 
from the Centers for Disease Control in 2015 as ‘one of the largest 
[outbreaks of Legionellosis] in the past decade.”219 
Although it was not possible for the state epidemiologists to draw 
definitive conclusions that the change in water supply was related to 
the outbreak of disease, there were strong indications that Flint’s water 
contributed to this outbreak.  The summer water temperatures and 
increased sediments in the water reduced residual chlorine levels, 
which increases the surface area for microbial growth.220  The sharp 
increase in cases also mirrors the time frame of Flint Water.221 
 
 213. “During pregnancy, lead is released from bones as maternal calcium and is used to help 
form the bones of the fetus. . . . Lead can also cross the placental barrier exposing the fetus to 
lead.”  Learn About Lead, supra note 208. 
 214. Id. 
 215. “Legionellosis is a reportable disease, meaning that infections with Legionella must be 
reported to local and state public health authorities. Public health specialists known as 
epidemiologists conduct analyses of cases, especially when the pattern of cases exceeds historical 
levels in a given jurisdiction.”  FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 24. 
 216. Samples can identify the presence of bacteria, but they cannot identify the source.  
Nevertheless, there is a strong indication that these increased cases were caused, at least in part, 
because of the reduced chlorine residual levels in Flint water.  Id. at 24–25. 
 217. Id. at 24. 
 218. WATER STUDY, supra note 203, at Flint Water Heater Study Jun. 20-July 1, 2016, Press 
Conference and Presentation Slides, slide 2; FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 24. 
 219. FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 24–25. 
 220. WATER STUDY, supra note 203, at slide 22. 
 221. Id.; FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 24–25. 
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c. Official Misconduct 
During this time of toxic water exposure, Flint residents were told 
repeatedly that the water was safe, and reports suggesting 
contamination and elevated lead blood levels were roundly dismissed 
and criticized.222  Because of the efforts of private citizens and one 
federal EPA official, it was finally revealed that Flint’s drinking water 
was not safe.  On September 29, 2015, the Genesee County Health 
Department warned citizens about Flint’s water quality.223  On October 
16, 2015, Flint returned to Detroit water.224 
Based on these facts, the Flint Task Force issued the following 
findings with respect to the City of Flint:225 
F-23. Flint Public Works personnel were ill-prepared to assume 
responsibility for full-time operation of the Flint WTP and 
distribution system. 
F-24. The Flint Water Treatment Plant (WTP) and installed 
treatment technologies were not adequate to produce safe, clean 
drinking water at startup of full-time operations. Flint’s lack of 
reinvestment in its water distribution system contributed to the 
drinking water crisis and ability to respond to water quality 
problems. 
F-25. Flint Public Works personnel failed to comply with LCR 
requirements, including the use of optimized corrosion control 
treatment and monitoring for lead. Flint personnel did not identify 
residences with LSLs, secure an adequate number of tap water 
samples from high-risk homes, or use prescribed sampling practices 
(for example, line and tap flushing methods and sample bottle sizes). 
F-26. Flint Public Works acted on inaccurate and improper guidance 
from MDEQ. 
F-27. Many communities similarly rely on MDEQ to provide 
technical assistance and guidance on how to meet regulatory 
requirements. In the case of Flint, MDEQ assistance was deeply 
flawed and lax, which led to myopic enforcement of regulations 
designed to protect public health. 
F-28. The emergency manager structure made it extremely difficult 
for Flint citizens to alter or check decision-making on preparations 
for use of Flint River water, or to receive responses to concerns 
about subsequent water quality issues.226 
 
 222. FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 18–21. 
 223. Id. at 21. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 8. 
 226. Id. at 8 (emphasis added). 
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2. The Crisis in Context 
These instances of official misconduct certainly did not occur in a 
vacuum.  Understanding this context is what sheds light on the deficits 
of cooperative federalism, here with respect to the locality.  Conditions 
in Flint have been grim for some time,227 and what follows below flies 
in the face of the EPA’s statement in 1973 that there would be little 
need for state or federal involvement in local water supply, and market 
demands would incentivize safe water.228 
a. Flint’s Population Decline & Its Impact on Water Quality 
Flint has lost fifty percent of its population since 1960, with a 
twenty percent decline in just the past fifteen years.229   Flint also has 
one of the smallest population growth rates in the country, with ninety-
nine percent of American cities of the same size growing at faster 
rates.230 
Population decline plays a role in Flint Water in a variety of ways.  
There are obvious implications with respect to the tax base and 
generating the revenue needed to pay the ever-increasing rates Detroit 
had been charging Flint.231  There also may be a link between the 
population decline and the increased Detroit rates.  The long-term 
contract between Flint and Detroit expired in 2000, which allowed 
Detroit to increase the rates as the entities shifted to year-to-year 
contracts.232  When the situation reached its breaking point in April 
2014, both Flint and Detroit had lost local government autonomy and 
were being led by state-appointed emergency managers.233  It is 
possible that the decline in the overall amount of water Flint needed 
made the transactions less cost-effective for Detroit, with increased 
prices as a consequence. 
 
 227. The Flint Water Task Force recommends Eric Scorsone and Nicolette Bateson, Long-
Term Crisis and Systemic Failure: Taking the Fiscal Stress of America’s Older Cities Seriously: 
Case Study, Flint Michigan (Michigan State University Extension, Sept. 2011) as a useful source 
to learn more about Flint.  See FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 15 n.11. 
 228. March 1973 EPA Press Release, supra note 95. 
 229. Flint’s population numbered more than 200,000 in 1960.  By 2014, its population was 
below 100,000.  FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 15 (citing BiggestUSCities.com, Flint 
Michigan Population History 1920-2015, www.biggestuscities.com/city/flint-michigan [hereinafter 
Population History]). 
 230. Population History, supra note 229. 
 231. FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 16 (stating that during the last 10-year period of 
its contractual service, DWSD raised Flint’s water rates on average 6.2 percent per year). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
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The population reduction also implicates Flint’s water quality. 
The city system was designed decades ago to service more than twice 
the current population of Flint.234  As we know, the lead contamination 
is caused by the corrosive Flint River water traveling through lead 
pipes without appropriate corrosion control.235  A reduction in 
population decreases the demand for water, which, in turn, increases 
the amount of time the corrosive water is stagnant in the lead pipes, 
which in turn can increase the level of lead contamination.236 
b. Poverty & Its Impact on Water Quality and Public Health 
Poverty is pervasive and also plays a role in the crisis in terms of 
risk and lack of market pressure.  According to the Flint Water Task 
Force, in 2014, the number of people in Flint living below the federal 
poverty threshold was almost three times the rate of poverty 
nationwide, and median property values were roughly eighty percent 
less than the national average.237  This implicates the city’s and the 
residents’ ability to improve aging infrastructure and replace lead 
pipes.238 
When Flint’s emergency manager announced in April 2015 that 
the financial emergency in Flint had been resolved, he noted that there 
was still a structural deficit in Flint’s five-year revenue projections.239  
He also noted ongoing concerns for the city’s ability to provide quality 
services to residents (describing them as already low in quality) and the 
ongoing issues with aging infrastructure and high water rates.240  These 
characterizations help tell the story about why people left Flint in 
 
 234. Letter from Gerald Ambrose, Flint Emergency Manager, to Honorable Rick Snyder, 
Governor of the State of Michigan, 3 (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.cityofflint.com/wp-content/up 
loads/Emergency-Manager-Exit-Letter.pdf [hereinafter Ambrose Letter]. 
 235. FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 16. 
 236. Remarks by Ms. Elin Betanzo, PE (Senior Policy Analyst, Northeast Midwest Institute) 
at University of Detroit Mercy, Detroit, MI (Apr. 14, 2016) (notes on file with author) 
[hereinafter Betanzo Remarks]. Reduced demand also increases the water’s age, which degrades 
the chlorine used to protect against pathogens.  Ron Fonger, EPA Letter Questions Flint’s Ability 
to Provide Clean Water in the Long Term, MLIVE (Jun. 17, 2016) http://www.mlive.com/news 
/index.ssf/2016/06/epa_questions_flints_ability_t.html.  With respect to Ms. Betanzo, she 
questioned Flint’s conversion to the Flint River and asked her long-time friend and Flint 
pediatrician, Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha, to analyze blood lead level samples of Flint children.  It 
is Dr. Hanna-Attisha’s analysis and public pronouncements that revealed the elevated blood lead 
levels and prompted action.  Riley, supra note 146. 
 237. FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 15 (citing Quick Facts for Flint, Michigan and the 
United States, U.S. CENSUS, www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/00 (Sept. 30, 2016)). 
 238. Betanzo Remarks, supra note 236. 
 239. Ambrose Letter, supra note 234, at 3. 
 240. Id. 
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droves.  The emergency manager’s predictions though were geared 
more toward Flint’s ability to attract new residents and increase tax 
revenue. 
Health statistics, recorded before the crisis was fully known, are 
even more dire.  Flint is the largest population center in Genesee 
County, and 2015 statistics rank that county, out of eighty-two 
Michigan counties: 
 81st in health outcomes 
 81st in quality of life 
 78th in length of life 
 78th in social and economic factors 
 77th in health behaviors, and 
 75th in physical environment measures.241 
“Only the quality of clinical care, for which the county ranked 
twenty-second, is not a cause of acute community concern.” 242  These 
statistics reveal the dire conditions in which local residents live and the 
general failure or inability of government to help. 
These factors cut against the argument raised by the EPA in 1973 
with respect to market demands incentivizing safe water.243  It is fair to 
assume that these people had little market power.  It is not the case 
that they could readily move (or vote with their feet).  They also would 
have few to no options for alternative water supplies. 
c. The Economy & Its Impact on Accountability 
This economic situation also created a lack of local control and 
government accountability, as both the City of Detroit and the City of 
Flint were being operated by emergency managers, meaning that the 
authority vested in elected mayors and city council members was 
overruled by the state.244  This article does not delve into the debate 
over these laws; however, where they are in place one must recognize 
that there is the potential absence of the typical checks and balances 
we rely on to ensure government accountability. 
This is the case in Flint, where the decision to switch to the Flint 
River was made by the Flint emergency manager, as was the delayed 
 
 241. FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 15 (citing Genesee (GE), County Health 
Rankings, www.countyhealthrankings.org/app/michigan/2015/rankings/genesee/county/outcome 
s/overall/snapshot (Sept. 30, 2016)). 
 242. Id. 
 243. March 1973 EPA Press Release, supra note 95. 
 244. FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 39–40. 
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decision to revert to Detroit water.245  There also is evidence that the 
residents’ repeated concerns over drinking water quality went 
unheeded by the emergency manager, who was accountable to the 
State of Michigan, not the people of Flint.246  As noted by the Flint 
Taskforce: 
The Flint water crisis occurred when state-appointed emergency 
managers replaced local representative decision-making in Flint, 
removing the checks and balances and public accountability that 
come with public decision-making. Emergency managers made key 
decisions that contributed to the crisis[.]  Given the demographics of 
Flint, the implications for environmental injustice cannot be ignored 
or dismissed.247 
d. The Crux of the Case—Conversion and Continued Use of a 
Challenged Water Source 
In this context, one can see that Flint was vulnerable to pollution 
and mismanagement; however, it still begs the question why Flint 
would convert to the highly corrosive and contaminated Flint River 
and its mothballed treatment plant and then delay a return to safe 
water from Detroit.  Sadly, the potential answers come down to money 
and perhaps to the development of an alternative water source—the 
Karegnondi Water Authority (“KWA”). 
i. The Karegnondi Water Authority 
The KWA is a new $285 million248 pipeline that will bring raw 
water from Lake Huron to Flint and other localities.249  Flint and the 
Genesee County Drain Commission began to explore alternatives to 
Detroit water as early as 2004.250  There was a 2004 technical 
assessment of the Flint River, which raised concerns about using it as a 
drinking water source because it was susceptible to contamination.251  
In 2006, a drain commission feasibility study indicated that the Flint 
River could be treated, but it was not a feasible permanent water 
 
 245. Id. at 1. 
 246. Id. at 1, 7. 
 247. Id. at 1. 
 248. Paul Egan, ‘Sweetheart’ Bond Deal Aided Flint Water Split from Detroit, DET. FREE 
PRESS (May 12, 2016),  http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2016/0 
5/11/did-state-give-flint-break-its-water/84238120/. 
 249. The pipeline will service Genesee County, Lapeer County, Sanilac County, the City of 
Flint, and the City of Lapeer.  Karegnondi Water Authority Bylaws, § 2.2 (adopted Oct. 26, 2010, 
amended Sept. 23, 2013), http://media.wix.com/ugd/60e74e_c4608d16cd2c4bb8afdc8bf1059608 
60.pdf. 
 250. See FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at app. V. 
 251. Id. 
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source because of its capacity.252  (Recall Betanzo’s position that lack 
of capacity or contamination typically would cause a supplier to look 
for an alternative source.253  Here, Flint chose a source that lacked 
capacity and was prone to contamination.)  The search was still 
ongoing in 2008, when the Drain Commission, also negotiating on 
behalf of Flint, asked Detroit for a short-term contract, as it was still 
assessing its “long-term needs.”254 
The KWA began to take shape in 2009, when the Drain 
Commission sought and received a permit to withdraw water from 
Lake Huron, and Genesee County approved KWA Articles of 
Incorporation.255 
Although there were ongoing questions about its feasibility and 
cost,256 KWA was seen as the future of Flint’s economy.257  On March 
25, 2013, Flint’s city council approved, by a vote of seven to one, the 
decision of Flint’s emergency manager to join the KWA.258   Indicative 
of the city’s loss of autonomy, this vote was not binding, and the 
ultimate decision rested with the State Treasurer, who noted his 
approval of the action on March 28, 2013, and authorized Flint’s 
emergency manager to take action in April 2013.259  On April 16, 2013, 
Flint’s emergency manager executed the KWA agreement separating 
Flint from Detroit water and binding it to participate in KWA.260 
On April 17, 2013, the day after Flint’s emergency manager 
executed the KWA agreement, Detroit terminated its year-to-year 
contract with Flint and announced it would suspend services effective 
April 2014.261  The KWA was expected to become operational in 2016, 
which left Flint with a two-year gap in coverage.  Flint then announced 
its decision to fill this gap by supplying its own water, using the Flint 
River and its old treatment plant as of April 2014.262  This action was 
taken in spite of the fact that Genesee County continued to use Detroit 
 
 252. Id. 
 253. See Riley, supra note 146. 
 254. FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at app. V. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id.  There appears to be some inconsistencies in the Flint Final Report, which also 
indicates that this approval took place on April 16, 2013.  See id. at 16. 
 259. Id. at app. V.  
 260. Id.  
 261. Termination Letter, supra note 180. 
 262. FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at app. V. 
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water,263 the Flint River had been judged previously as an unacceptable 
source,264 the treatment plant had not been fully operational since the 
1960’s,265 and WTP personnel warned against such action, noting the 
WTP was not staffed or equipped to take on the charge.266 
ii. Decision to Convert to the Flint River 
So why did Flint convert to the Flint River?  One could argue that 
Flint discontinued using Detroit water because it could not afford it; 
however, there is a factual dispute in this regard.267  KWA claims that 
Detroit rates increased 11.18 percent from 2002-15, including a massive 
23.61 percent increase from 2013-15, although KWA admits it used a 
different timeframe to calculate 2014 and 15 rates.268  On the other 
hand, the Flint Taskforce reports that the annual average increase in 
Detroit rates for the last ten years of the DWSD/Flint contract was 6.2 
percent.269  Regardless of the rate increase, however, only Flint began 
to use the Flint River.  KWA itself reports that Genesee County 
continued using Detroit water,270 which suggests that the rates may not 
have been prohibitive. 
Another possibility has come to light more recently, indicating 
that Flint’s conversion to the Flint River was a condition precedent to 
 
 263. Of all of the cities within Genesee County, only Flint converted to the Flint River during 
the two-year gap period between Detroit water and the new Karegnondi Water Authority 
pipeline described below.  The Genesee County Drain Commission continued to provide Detroit 
water to all of its customers (19 different cities and townships) pending the KWA shift.  Genesee 
County Press Release, Clarification Reminder for Genesee County Water Customers (Jan. 9, 
2015), http://ftpcontent2.worldnow.com/wjrt/PDF/Presspercent20Release.Geneseepercent20Co 
untypercent20WWSpercent20Customerpercent20Notice.pdf. 
 264. FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at app. V. 
 265. Id. at 15. 
 266. Id. at app. V. 
 267. Allie Gross, New E-mails Reveal the Switch to the Flint River Was Not About Saving 
Money, METRO TIMES (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.metrotimes.com/Blogs/archives/2016/01/25/ne 
w-emails-reveal-the-switch-to-the-flint-river-was-not-about-saving-money (challenging the 
continued and often-repeated claim that Flint switched to the Flint River because of Detroit rates 
and reporting that Detroit’s offer to Flint would have cut Flint’s rates by 48 percent, with a 30-
year projection that Detroit’s rates would be 20 percent less than KWA); email from Sue 
McCormick to Jim Fausone, William Wolfson, and Bill Johnson (Apr. 15, 2013) (on file with 
author). 
 268. Karegnondi Water Authority, Sloan PowerPoint Presentation, Dawn of a New Era in 
Water Supply, slide 14, http://media.wix.com/ugd/60e74e_e0588f95f1eb481db5d33f7d8b28a0b 
3.pdf (last visited July 10, 2016) [hereinafter Sloan Slides]. 
 269. The original long-term DWSD/Flint contract expired in 2000 and, by its terms, continued 
on a year-to-year basis until either one of the parties terminated it.  During this year-to-year 
phase, the DWSD increased its rates an average of 6.2 percent per year.  FLINT FINAL REPORT, 
supra note 5, at 16. 
 270. Genesee County Press Release, supra note 263. 
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the KWA obtaining funding.  The Detroit Free Press and reporter Paul 
Egan, who is an award-winning investigative journalist,271 is now 
reporting that recently released e-mails raise new questions about why 
Flint began to draw its water from the Flint River in April 2014.272 
The Free Press reports that “Flint’s financial condition was so dire 
in 2014 that it threatened the ability of the Karegnondi Water 
Authority to issue bonds and start construction[.]”273  The article goes 
on to suggest that the project was rescued when KWA bond attorneys 
and a state employee prompted the Michigan Department of 
Environmental Quality to issue a state environmental order.”274 
E-mails suggest bond attorneys insisted on wording that linked the 
relatively inexpensive work the DEQ ordered [Flint to complete 
regarding WTP sludge] to the entire KWA project, thus lifting Flint’s 
entire share of the project debt from its municipal debt limit, despite 
the fact the DEQ was not ordering Flint to participate in the KWA. 
Both the administrative consent order and the wording similar to 
what the attorneys specified were referenced in the 2014 prospectus 
the KWA issued to prospective bond buyers. 275 
The wording said, in part, that Flint “plans to use the Flint River 
as its temporary source of untreated water supply until KWA water is 
available,” and “must undertake the KWA public improvement 
project or undertake other public improvement projects to continue to 
use the Flint River.”276 
KWA denies that it had any involvement with Flint’s decision to 
switch to the Flint River.  In support of its denial, KWA cites the 
contract termination letter the DWSD director sent to Flint the day 
after Flint’s emergency manager executed the KWA contract.277  A 
troubling question is why Detroit terminated its contract with Flint.  It 
is clear that Detroit opposed the KWA in 2009.  It spoke out against 
KWA during the permit process and offered Flint a long-term contract 
 
 271. Free Press Wins Michigan AP Newspaper of the Year, 14 1st-Place Awards, DET. FREE 
PRESS (May 23, 2016), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2016/05/22/free-
press-wins-top-ap-editors-awards/84746988/. 
 272. Egan, supra note 248.  Readers also should note the important role played by local 
investigative journalists in bringing the facts of Flint Water to light.  The Taskforce praised local 
journalists and engaged residents for bringing the facts of Flint Water to light.  FLINT FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 5, at 15 n.10.  The report even goes so far as to state that the facts may have 
never been known without the work of these citizens.  “Without their courage and persistence, 
this crisis likely never would have been brought to light and mitigation efforts never begun.”  Id. 
 273. Egan, supra note 248. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Sloan Slides, supra note 268, at slides 31–32. 
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that it claimed was more cost effective than KWA.278 It is not 
unreasonable to suggest Detroit did not want a competitor in the 
market, but what was the benefit to either party to terminate the 
Detroit contract and leave Flint with the two-year gap? Moreover, one 
should remember that, as of 2014, the State of Michigan oversaw both 
localities through its emergency managers--Flint as of November 
2011279 and Detroit as of March 2013.280  Why then was it that “efforts 
to arrive at an agreement between the parties during the final year of 
service to the City of Flint ultimately failed”?281 
3. The Aftermath 
The situation in Flint remains complicated and largely unresolved.  
The original failures of cooperative federalism now appear to be 
impeding a meaningful resolution. 
On December 14, 2015, the City of Flint declared an emergency.282  
On January 14, 2016, Governor Snyder requested that a federal 
emergency be declared and federal funds be made available.283  On 
January 16, 2016, the President of the United States declared Flint was 
in a state of emergency and authorized federal relief funds.284 
On January 21, 2016, almost one year after EPA first learned of 
the Flint issue, the EPA issued an eighteen-page administrative order 
directing Flint, MDEQ, and the State of Michigan to address the 
crisis.285  The EPA found that the water “poses imminent and 
substantial endangerment to the health of Flint residents [and that the] 
endangerment will continue unless preventative actions are taken.”286  
The EPA also noted that although there has been some progress, 
“there continues to be delays in responding to critical EPA 
recommendations and in implementing the actions necessary to reduce 
and minimize the presence of the lead and other contaminants in the 
water supply.”287 
 
 278. FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at app. V. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Ashley Woods, Detroit Emergency Manager: Gov. Rick Snyder Announces State 
Financial Takeover, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/ 
14/detroit-emergency-manager_n_2871371.html. 
 281. FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 16. 
 282. FLINT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER, supra note 1, at ¶ 22. 
 283. Id. at ¶ 23. 
 284. Id. at ¶ 24. 
 285. See generally id. 
 286. Id. at ¶ 33. 
 287. Id. at ¶ 34. 
Warren - For Publication (Do Not Delete) 3/9/2017  10:29 AM 
Fall 2016] AN AMERICAN RESET 91 
With respect to the City, the EPA stated that it “remains 
concerned that the City lacks the professional expertise and resources 
needed to carry out the recommended actions and to safely manage the 
City’s public water system.288  The EPA reiterated these concerns in 
June 2016, noting that the water treatment plant remained 
inadequately staffed, operated, or administered.289 
It remains an open question whether the lead service lines in Flint 
will be replaced.  In January 2016, the NRDC and others filed suit 
seeking the removal of Flint’s lead service lines.290  Flint’s mayor also 
has called for the replacement of lead service lines in the city.  The 
process has been stalled because of cost.  While the State of Michigan 
has announced a seventy-five point plan that does not call for the 
replacement of all lead service lines,291 it has given Flint a $2.5 million 
grant and the promise of additional funding to remove some lead 
pipes.292  Unfortunately, the cost per home appears to be more than 
double the city’s original estimate and more than the cost permitted by 
restrictive language in the state’s grant.  As of summer 2016, Flint’s 
mayor had proposed moving forward with a “pilot” program to replace 
250 lead service lines to get a better sense of the cost.293 
In addition to delays, there is much finger-pointing between state 
and federal officials, as demonstrated by the testimony Governor Rick 
Snyder and EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy gave to the House 
Committee on Oversight & Governmental Reform on March 17, 
2016.294 
As for the actual water supply, Flint reverted to Detroit water in 
October 2015.  Lead levels are now coming down.  As of July 2016, the 
last round of random testing performed by residents and Professor 
Edwards’ team revealed the ninetieth percentile was 13.9 parts per 
billion, which is just below the fifteen parts per billion action level.295  
 
 288. Id. 
 289. Ron Fonger, EPA Letter Questions Flint’s Ability to Provide Clean Water in the Long 
Term, MLIVE (June 17, 2016), http://www.mlive.com/news/index.ssf/2016/06/epa_questions_flints 
_ability_t.html. 
 290. WIDESPREAD LEAD CRISIS, supra note 1, at 10–12. 
 291. Goals to Strengthen Flint, MICHIGAN.GOV (Mar. 21, 2016), http://www.michigan.gov/doc 
uments/snyder/GoalsToStrengthenFlint_FinalMarch_20_2016_517484_7.pdf. 
 292. Extended Water Testing in Flint Continues Showing Positive Signs, MICHIGAN.GOV (July 
8, 2016), http://www.michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-277—388196—,00.html. 
 293. Matthew Dolan, Flint to Replace up to 250 Lead Lines in Water Crisis, DET. FREE PRESS 
(Jul. 13, 2016), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2016/07/13/flint-
replace-up-250-lead-lines-water-crisis/87027512. 
 294. Transcript of March 17, 2016, supra note 150. 
 295. WATER STUDY, supra note 203, at slide 14. 
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Forty-five percent of the samples also had no detectable level of lead, 
which is a real improvement from the 2015 study that showed only nine 
percent had no detectable levels.296 
Flint will continue to use Detroit water until the KWA pipeline 
becomes operational,297 which still has not occurred.  The EPA has 
ordered certain measures to be taken before Flint converts to a new 
water source, including the submission of a written plan, offered in 
advance and with an opportunity for public comment, which 
demonstrates Flint has the technical, managerial, and financial capacity 
to operate its public water system.298 
With respect to the KWA, there appears to be an ongoing dispute 
whether it will be as cost effective as promised.  The mayor is 
questioning the veracity of KWA’s original claims of water-rate 
savings.  KWA itself now claims that it never promised to reduce the 
customer rates of Flint residents; it allegedly only claimed to reduce 
the price Flint would pay for its raw water.299 
The conclusion with respect to localities, as evidenced by Flint 
Water, is that tremendous pressures can be placed on them, including 
the “choice” to convert to challenged water sources, and they may be 
powerless to galvanize action on the part of state and federal officials.  
We next turn to the second actor in the scheme—the State of Michigan. 
B. The State of Michigan 
The premise with respect to state actors is that they may be too lax 
in their reporting and enforcement of safe drinking water standards.  
They also may become too involved in local decisions, especially in 
instances of financially troubled localities, which makes the state both 
the supplier and the regulator of the supplier. 
1. State Behavior 
The State of Michigan is the primary enforcer in Michigan of the 
Safe Drinking Water Act.300  The Flint Taskforce, appointed by  
 
 
 296. Id. at slide 15. 
 297. License to Transmit Water executed by the City of Flint and Genesee County Drain 
Commissioner (Oct. 14, 2015), http://media.wix.com/ugd/60e74e_0e77bc4182c248d4ad728860f47f 
5f00.pdf. 
 298. FLINT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER, supra note 1, at ¶ 60. 
 299. See Paul Egan & Matthew Dolan, Official: Flint will lose everything if it leaves KWA, 
DET. FREE PRESS, June 13, 2016, http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-cris 
is/2016/06/11/official-flint-lose-everything-if-leaves-kwa/85662110/. 
 300. FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 22. 
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Governor Snyder, delivered a strong indictment of the state’s behavior 
in this case:301 
F-1. The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality bears 
primary responsibility for the water contamination in Flint. 
F-2. MDEQ, specifically its Office of Drinking Water and Municipal 
Assistance (ODWMA), suffers from cultural shortcomings that 
prevent it from adequately serving and protecting the public health 
of Michigan residents. 
F-3. MDEQ misinterpreted the LCR and misapplied its 
requirements. Thus, lead-in-water levels were under-reported and 
many residents’ exposure to high lead levels was prolonged for 
months. 
F-4. MDEQ waited months before accepting EPA’s offer to engage 
its lead (Pb) experts to help address the Flint water situation and, at 
times, MDEQ staff were dismissive and unresponsive. 
*** 
F-13. The Governor’s knowledge, and that of Governor’s office staff, 
of various aspects of the Flint water crisis was compromised by the 
information—much of it wrong—provided by MDEQ and MDHHS. 
F-14. The Governor’s office continued to rely on incorrect 
information provided by these departments despite mounting 
evidence from outside experts and months of citizens’ complaints 
throughout the Flint water crisis, only changing course in early 
October 2015 when MDEQ and MDHHS finally acknowledged the 
extent of the problem of lead in the public water supply. 
F-15. The suggestion made by members of the Governor’s executive 
staff in October 2014 to switch back to DWSD should have resulted, 
at a minimum, in a full and comprehensive review of the water 
situation in Flint, similar to that which accompanied the earlier 
decision to switch to KWA. It was disregarded, however, because of 
cost considerations and repeated assurances that the water was safe. 
The need to switch back to DWSD became even more apparent as 
water quality and safety issued continued and lead issues began to 
surface in 2015, notwithstanding reassurances by MDEQ. 
F-16. The Flint water crisis highlights the risks of over-reliance—in 
fact, almost exclusive reliance—on a few staff in one or two 
departments for information on which key decisions are based. 
F-17. Official state public statements and communications about the 
Flint water situation have at times been inappropriate and 
unacceptable. 
F-18. Emergency managers, not locally elected officials, made the 
decision to switch to the Flint River as Flint’s primary water supply 
source. 
F-19. Treasury officials, through the terms of the local emergency 
 
 301. Id. at 6–8. 
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financial assistance loan executed by the Flint emergency manager 
on April 29, 2015, effectively precluded a return to DWSD water, as 
Flint citizens and local officials were demanding, without prior state 
approval. 
F-20. The role of the emergency managers in Flint (in combination 
with MDEQ’s failures) places primary accountability for what 
happened with state government. 
F-21. Emergency managers charged with financial reform often do 
not have, nor are they supported by, the necessary expertise to 
manage non-financial aspects of municipal government.302 
The Flint Taskforce suggests Michigan was not acting as a 
regulator or as an enforcer.  Public announcements by private citizens 
drove action rather than the State of Michigan.  The state was involved 
in making local decisions, and perhaps got too closely involved in those 
local decisions, and then sought to protect its decisions from scrutiny.  
And the “bad behavior” does not focus exclusively on those charged 
criminally.  The Taskforce notes that multiple state actors failed in 
their respective duties, including MDEQ, MDHHS, the Health 
Department, and the Governor.303 
As of August 2016, Michigan’s attorney general had pursued a 
total of thirty-six criminal charges, including misconduct in office and 
willful neglect of duty.304  The first set is against one local and two state 
officials.305  The second set is against six state officials related to 
falsifying and covering up reports that would have brought the crisis to 
light.306  When these charges were announced, the attorney general 
said: 
 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. at 1. 
 304. See Press Release, Bill Schuette, Attorney Gen., State of Mich. Schuette Charges Three 
with Multiple Felonies in First Stage of Crisis Investigation (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.michigan 
.gov/ag/0,4534,7-164-46849_47203-382827—,00.html (listing 18 different charges filed against 
state officials); Press Release, Bill Schuette, Attorney Gen., State of Mich. Schuette Charges Six 
More in Flint Water Crisis (July 2016), http://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,4534,7-164-46849_47203-
390055—,00.html (listing an additional 18 charges filed against current and former state officials) 
[hereinafter AG July Press Release]. 
 305. Complaint, Michigan v. Busch, Prysby, Glasgow, (Genesee County Circuit Court, Apr. 
2016), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/ag/Complaint-Flint_Water_First_Charges_522704_7 
.pdf [hereinafter Criminal Complaint 1]. 
 306. AG July Press Release, supra note 304. The second criminal complaint relates to (1) 
misleading federal and county officials as to the quality of Flint drinking water; (2) authorizing a 
permit to the Flint Water Treatment Plant knowing the Flint WTP was deficient in its ability to 
provide clean and safe drinking water; (3) tampering with monitoring reports that are mandated 
by law; (4) tampering with Lead and Copper Reports and Consumer Notices of Lead Results; (5) 
ceasing optimal corrosion control treatment at the Flint WTP and/or refusing to mandate 
optimized corrosion control treatment; (6) improperly manipulating the collection of water 
samples and/or removing test results from samples; and (7) negligent operation of the Flint WTP. 
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The victims are real people, families who have been lied to by 
government officials and been treated as expendable. But when our 
investigation is completed and our prosecutions are successful—and 
we believe they will be—then accountability and justice will be 
delivered to families of Flint and families of Michigan.307 
2. State Behavior in Context 
As noted above, one purpose of this paper is to put the bare facts 
into context to help us better understand the story of Flint Water and 
how it may be considered a case study on the challenges of cooperative 
federalism. Despite the outrageous findings above, Michigan is not 
generally a rogue state. It is much like others in the country. 
a. The State of Michigan Generally and Its Relationship with Flint 
The State of Michigan is led by Governor Rick Snyder (R) and a 
Republican-led House and Senate.308  Michigan has been ranked the 
sixteenth most “eco-friendly” state in the United States.  As noted 
above, it scores fourth overall in water quality.309  It is surrounded by 
the five Great Lakes, which account for one-fifth of the world’s fresh 
surface water, a staggering six quadrillion gallons of fresh water.310  
With respect to infrastructure, it received a “D” rating by the 
American Society of Civil Engineers.311 
i. Economy & Solvency 
As of 2015, Business Insider ranked Michigan the seventeenth 
strongest economy of the fifty states and the District of Columbia, 
when considering the state’s unemployment rates, gross domestic 
product per capita, average weekly wages, and recent growth rates for 
nonfarm payroll jobs, GDP, house prices, and wages.312  In 2016, 
Michigan’s fiscal health was ranked thirty-fifth of the fifty states and 
Puerto Rico by the Marcatus Center of George Mason University.  
 
 307. Id. 
 308. Senator Information, MICH. SEN., http://www.senate.michigan.gov/senatorinfo.html (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2016) (Republicans holding a 27 to 10 seat majority in the Senate, with one 
vacancy); Michigan Representative, MICH HOUSE, http://house.michigan.gov/mhrpublic/frm 
RepList.aspx (last visited Oct. 3, 2016) (Republicans holding 63 to 47 seat majority in the House 
of Representatives). 
 309. Kiernan, supra note 7. 
 310. GREAT LAKES INFO. NETWORK, supra note 8. 
 311. FY 2017 BUDGET PRESENTATION, supra note 121, at Slide 15. 
 312. Andy Kiersz, Ranked: The Economies of All 50 States and D.C. from the Worst to Best, 
BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/state-economy-ranking-july-2015-
2015-7. 
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Specifically, the study found Michigan to be below average in terms of 
cash solvency (i.e., its ability to pay short-term bills), budget solvency 
(i.e., whether state has ability to generate revenue to cover 
expenditures), and trust fund solvency (i.e., how much debt the state 
has).313 
ii. Budget & Infrastructure Spending 
Consistent with a nation-wide trend of conservative spending, as 
states are finally reaching pre-recession revenue and spending levels,314 
Michigan’s proposed 2017 budget calls for a 0.8 percent increase in 
total spending, and 1.5 percent increase in general fund spending.315 
Its lack of focus on the environment also is consistent with other 
states.316 The budget breaks down into the following categories of 
spending.317  
 45 percent Health and human services 
 30 percent Education 
 10 percent Jobs 
 7 percent Government services 
 6 percent Public safety 
 2 percent Environment 
 -1 percentReserves 
There are state-wide infrastructure expenditures related to the 
inner-city passenger project, recreational lands, game and hunting, 
forests, and boating.318  There also is a call for $165 million for a state-
wide infrastructure319 fund and the creation of a Commission on 
twenty-first century Infrastructure.320 
 
 313. Mercatus Ctr., Ranking the States by Fiscal Condition: Michigan, GEO. MASON U. (2016) 
http://mercatus.org/statefiscalrankings/michigan. This is down from 34th in 2015, but up 
compared to 2014 when Michigan was ranked 37th, see Mercatus Ctr., Ranking the States by 
Fiscal Condition, Geo. Mason U. (2015) http://mercatus.org/statefiscalrankings-2015-edition; see 
Mercatus Ctr., State Fiscal Condition: Ranking the 50 States, Geo. Mason U. (2014) 
http://mercatus.org/publication/state-fiscal-condition-ranking-50-states-2014. 
 314. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, SUMMARY: SPRING 2016 
FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES, 5 (June 21, 2016), http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/Summary 
%20of%20Spring%202016%20Fiscal%20Survey.pdf [hereinafter NASBO—Summary Spring 
2016]. 
 315. H.R. 5294, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2017) [hereinafter FY 2017 ENACTED BUDGET]. 
 316. NASBO—Summary Spring 2016, supra note 314. 
 317. Id. 
 318. FY 2017 ENACTED BUDGET, supra note 315, at 4, 61, 223, 261, 266. 
 319. FY 2017 BUDGET PRESENTATION, supra note 121, at slide 16.  Unlike the Flint plans, 
the state-wide plan calls expressly for the replacement of lead and copper service lines.  The Flint 
references are more vague. 
 320. Id. at 15. 
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With respect to Flint, there is a specific allocation for an additional 
investment of $195 million to continue support and address various 
needs for Flint.321  The governor has called for a system-wide 
assessment or pipes, a plan to prioritize replacement, the replacement 
of fixtures in schools and day care centers, and a vague reference to 
“abatement in homes.”322  With this said, however, the Flint plan 
appears much more focused on screening, sampling, and medical and 
community support and less about addressing the infrastructure.  The 
former is obviously meeting important immediate needs, but the latter 
should be equally so. 
iii. Transparency 
In 2012, one year into Governor Snyder’s administration, 
Michigan was named one of the least transparent states in the country, 
as one of only eight states to receive an “F” overall on the 
accountability study’s grid.323  This included an “F” in ten of fourteen 
individual categories.324  More recent data on this topic was not located. 
iv. Michigan’s Relationship with Flint—State Emergency 
Management 
The relationship between Flint and the State of Michigan was 
strained before Flint Water because of the state’s appointment of 
Flint’s emergency manager in 2011.325  As noted above, nineteen states 
and the District of Columbia have emergency manager laws, and their 
use may impair the supplier-regulator boundary that we rely on for safe 
water.326 
Flint’s process began in August 2011, when the Michigan 
Department of Treasury recommended a Financial Review Team be 
appointed for the City of Flint, which had a $25.7 million deficit.327  In 
 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. at slides 9-13. 
 323. Caitlin Ginley, Grading the Nation: How Accountable is Your State?, CTR. FOR PUB. 
INTEGRITY (Mar. 19, 2012, 12:01 AM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/03/19/8423/grading-
nation-how-accountable-your-state. 
 324. Chris Andrews, Michigan Gets F Grade in 2012 State Integrity Investigation, CTR. FOR 
PUB. INTEGRITY (Mar. 19, 2012, 12:01 AM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/03/19/ 
18188/michigan-gets-f-grade-2012-state-integrity-investigation.  The categories were: Executive 
Accountability, Judicial Accountability, Legislative Accountability, State Civil Service 
Management, State Insurance Commissions, State Pension Fund Management, Political 
Fundraising, Lobbyist Disclosures, Ethics Enforcement Agencies, and Redistricting. 
 325. FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at app. V. 
 326. Edmondson, supra note 174. 
 327. FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at app. V. 
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September 2011, the governor appointed the team, and in November 
2011, the governor proceeded to appoint an emergency manager for 
the city.328  The emergency manager laid off City Hall appointees and 
terminated the mayor’s and the city council’s salaries.329 
Multiple disputes arose as a result.  The governor announced new 
lockup policies and increased police patrols.  Residents challenged the 
appointment of the emergency manager and the constitutionality of 
Michigan’s Emergency Manager laws.  Residents also began filing suit 
over water and sewage rates.330  In short, there was a breakdown in the 
relationship between Flint and the State of Michigan—one that 
predates Flint Water by more than three years. 
This breakdown would make it difficult for the state and locality 
to work together on any future challenge.  This obvious conclusion 
becomes even more fixed when the challenge—in this case, Flint 
Water–is connected to the source of the original breakdown: the 
emergency manager’s appointment and loss of local autonomy.  The 
author is a life-long Michigan resident and has followed public reports 
about Flint.  She recalls that the residents’ initial water complaints 
appeared to be a continuation of the ongoing challenges to the 
emergency manager’s appointment.  The State of Michigan, already 
entrenched in its support and use of the emergency management 
framework, might have been unwilling or unable to see or appreciate 
the legitimacy of the new or evolving water concerns. 
Flint Water clearly would not improve the relationship, but even 
after the Flint Taskforce issued its damning report, finding the MDEQ 
bore primary responsibility for the contamination in Flint,331 the state 
still felt empowered to implicitly threaten the residents of Flint.  In 
response to the city announcing its intention to sue the state to recoup 
money for declining property values and tax revenues, emergency 
manager costs, and medical claims, the governor’s communication 
director warned that the state was in the process of identifying its 
funding package for Flint, and any law suits against the state might 
affect those decisions.332  Specifically, he said any lawsuit would “get in  
 
 
 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. at 6. 
 332. Rick Pluta, Flint Getting Ready to Sue State, MICH. RADIO (Apr. 2016), http://michigan 
radio.org/post/flint-getting-ready-sue-state-deq#stream/0. 
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the way of efforts to convince Republicans in the Legislature to send 
more money and resources to Flint.”333 
v. Michigan’s Connection to the KWA 
As noted above, The Free Press reported that the state and KWA 
asserted a very heavy hand in the decision to convert to the Flint River.  
The MDEQ has a policy of seeking compliance and enforcement of 
environmental statutes through three forms of enforcements actions: 
administrative, civil, and criminal.334  With an administrative 
enforcement action, either a unilateral order is issued (administrative 
consent order), or the MDEQ and an entity agree that the entity shall 
bring its actions into compliance (administrative consent 
agreement).335 
The Free Press reports that the usual practice of a municipality 
selling bonds to pay for the ordered correction, without consideration 
for the municipality’s debt limits, was “turned on its head” with respect 
to Flint and its decision to switch to the Flint River.336  In other words, 
the process allegedly was completely reversed, with the bond attorneys 
seeking an order first, then working backward through the chain.  The 
Free Press reports that it was the KWA bond attorneys and the now-
indicted state employee Stephen Busch, then Lansing district 
coordinator for the Michigan Office of Drinking Water and Municipal 
Assistance, who approached three different Michigan DEQ 
departments seeking an administrative consent order, even though the 
state was not pursuing any enforcement action related to the KWA or 
the use of the Flint River; the only action related to the use of a lagoon 
system for treatment plant sludge.337 
 
 333. Id. 
 334. MICH. DEP’T OF ENVTL QUALITY, Compliance and Enforcement, MICHIGAN.GOV 
http://www.michigan.gov/deq/0,4561,7-135-3311_4231_36974—-,00.html (last visited July 10, 
2016) [hereinafter MDEQ Compliance]. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Egan, supra note 248. 
 337. Id. The article quotes:  
“That’s part of my conundrum,” [Liane Shakter] Smith replied. “We don’t have an 
enforcement action with them. If they want an order regarding the lagoon then shouldn’t 
they be working with WRD?” She added: ”I need to speak to Steve Busch to understand 
what the ‘ask’ is.” 
Ultimately, the order was officially handled by a third DEQ section, the Office of Waste 
Management and Radiological Protection, though records show Busch played an active 
role in finalizing wording that would be agreeable to KWA bond attorneys. 
Smith was fired by the state in February for her role in the drinking water crisis. Busch 
already was suspended when Attorney General Bill Schuette, on April 20, charged him 
with misconduct in office, conspiracy and other crimes, for his alleged role. The charges, 
which are pending in Genesee County, do not relate to the administrative consent order. 
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If, as reported, the state saw conversion to the Flint River as a 
“condition precedent” to the KWA, which could be an important 
project for Flint and a massive infrastructure project for the state, etc., 
it probably would have been difficult to remain an objective and 
neutral regulator. It had a vested interest in the conversion to the Flint 
River. 
b. Tension between States and the Federal Government 
Regarding Safe Water 
As noted above, all U.S. states, except Wyoming, have gained 
primacy with respect to the Safe Drinking Water Act.  In 2004, 
Scheberle described the federal-state working relationship as “coming 
apart and contentious,” although that was a slight improvement from 
her 1998 study.338  She noted that “state officials do not perceive EPA 
as fully understanding public water suppliers, despite the agency’s 
concerted effort to reach out to stakeholders.”339 
Moreover, some states have gone so far as to assert their resistance 
to federal environmental directives “by adopting laws that prohibit 
state regulations from exceeding minimum federal standards, thus 
converting federal floors into ceilings.”340  As of 2004, this was true for 
no fewer than twenty-four states.341  This could be the case because 
“[b]y EPA’s own estimate, ‘no state, even after receiving a fee increase, 
has sufficient funding to meet all of the technical requirements of the 
Safe Drinking Water Act.’”342 
 
 
 
[One KWA bond attorney] e-mailed Flint finance director Gerald Ambrose and 
emergency manager Darnell Earley on March 18, 2014, telling them KWA was ready to 
proceed with a $220-million bond issue so it could continue pipeline construction.  
“However, we cannot take that step until the DEQ Administrative Consent Order is 
effective,” [the attorney wrote], and “the city needs the ACO in place by the end of this 
week.” 
“In order to ensure that the entire project can be financed . . . and that the city will have 
some debt capacity in the future, the ACO is a condition precedent to proceeding,” he 
wrote.  “If there is much more of a delay, the KWA will have expanded its initial 
resources and be forced to stop construction and the project will be delayed for at least 
one more construction cycle.” 
 338. SCHEBERLE, supra note 1, at 149. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary 
Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1145 (1995) (citing Jerome M. Organ, Limitations on State Agency 
Authority to Adopt Environmental Standards More Stringent Than Federal Standards: Policy 
Considerations and Interpretive Problems, 54 MD. L. REV. 1373 (1995)). 
 341. SCHEBERLE, supra note 1, at 1. 
 342. Id. at 138. 
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The NRDC and other reports detailing states’ non-compliance 
with the Lead and Copper Rule protocols also can be considered as 
part of the context. 
c. States’ Aggressively Challenging Federal Agency Authority in 
Court 
“[S]tate suits against the federal government are on the rise,”343 
not only challenging the constitutionality of federal statutes but also 
the way in which federal agencies are administering federal law.344  
These state challenges are occurring in a wide variety of fields.345  
Texas, for example, has filed at least forty-three suits against the 
federal government since President Obama took office.346  These are 
many suits related to climate change and air and water quality, as well 
as voter identification laws, immigration, redistricting, women’s health, 
gender equality, and business regulations.347 
It is not the goal of this article to explore these cases but rather to 
note their existence in general and the spirit they reflect.  Some states 
are taking an adversarial approach against federal authority and the 
assertion of federal agency authority.  At the same time, Grove 
suggests that the Supreme Court has “signaled its endorsement of such 
lawsuits”348 when in Massachusetts v. EPA, 
The Court upheld the State’s standing to challenge the EPA’s failure 
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, declaring that Massachusetts 
was entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis.  As scholars 
have observed, the decision in Massachusetts suggests that states 
should be accorded special access to federal court in order to 
challenge federal agency action.  That is, states have a special role in 
monitoring and improving federal agencies’ implementation of 
federal law.  Many scholars have welcomed these state-led lawsuits 
as a crucial new check on the administrative state.349 
This behavior would be a significant backdrop to any EPA 
decision to intervene in Michigan. 
 
 343. Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 
852 (2016). 
 344. Id. at 853. 
 345. Id. at 852. 
 346. Neena Satija, Texas v. the Feds – A Look at the Lawsuits, TEX. TRIB. (July 27, 2016, 12:01 
AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/07/27/texas-federal-government-lawsuits/. 
 347. Id. 
 348. Grove, supra note 343, at 853. 
 349. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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d. Increased State Financial Autonomy 
As noted above, federal funding has been a key ingredient to 
encourage state cooperation in national programs.  This situation is 
changing as federal funding wanes and new sources of state revenue 
are appearing.  States and localities may rely on a newly developing, 
world-wide trend to issue so called “green bonds.”350   They “are 
structured in the same way as other bonds, but the insurer self declares 
that the proceeds will be used to fund environmentally beneficial 
projects.”351   They can range from “general obligation bonds (backed 
by the issuer’s ‘entire balance sheet’), revenue bonds (backed by 
specific revenue streams such as water fees) and securitized bonds 
(backed by a pool of projects).”352  The use of green bonds has 
skyrocketed from “$500 million in 2010 to $3.8 billion in 2015.”353  
States such as California, New York, Massachusetts, Iowa, and Hawaii 
have used green bonds to fund a whole host of projects, including loans 
to municipalities for drinking and waste water infrastructure upgrades. 
354 
The conclusion with respect to states is that they may not be the 
regulator the cooperative federalism model assumes.  The potential for 
lax enforcement may stem from a state’s involvement in local water, its 
disrespect for the federal scheme and federal authority, or the fact that 
states are becoming increasingly more self-reliant in terms of 
experience and funding. 
C. The U.S. EPA 
This section explores the EPA’s delayed involvement in Flint and 
some root causes that might explain it. 
1. EPA Action in Flint 
The Flint Taskforce characterizes the EPA as the reluctant 
enforcer.  The Taskforce found: 
F-32. EPA failed to properly exercise its authority prior to January 
2016. EPA’s conduct casts doubt on its willingness to aggressively 
pursue enforcement (in the absence of widespread public outrage). 
EPA could have exercised its powers under Section 1414 and Section 
 
 350. Linda Breggin, States and Localities Are Finding a Huge Potential in Green Bonds, 
ENVTL F. 13, 13 (July/Aug. 2016). 
 351. Id. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. 
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1431 of the SDWA or under the LCR, 40 CFR 141.82(i). 
F-33. Despite the clear intent of the LCR, EPA has accepted 
differing compliance strategies that have served to mute its 
effectiveness in detection and mitigation of lead contamination risks. 
These strategies have been adopted at water systems and primacy 
agencies across the country. Though there may be some ambiguity 
in LCR rule, none of it relates to what MDEQ should have done in 
Flint. There was and remains no justification for MDEQ not 
requiring corrosion control treatment for the switch of water source 
to the Flint River. 
F-34. EPA was hesitant and slow to insist on proper corrosion 
control measures in Flint. MDEQ misinformation notwithstanding, 
EPA’s deference to MDEQ, the state primacy agency, delayed 
appropriate intervention and remedial measures. 
F-35. EPA tolerated MDEQ’s intransigence and issued, on 
November 3, 2015, a clarification memo on the LCR when no such 
clarification was needed.355 
Recently released e-mails support the Taskforce’s 
characterization.  Rather than taking on the strong tone of an entity in 
authority, the EPA appears to be worried about the state’s response to 
the EPA’s involvement. 
Ultimately, [Michigan Department of Environmental Quality] bore 
the brunt of the blame for a mistake that . . . EPA seemed to 
recognize as early as last April [2015]. . . . But in more than 5,000 
pages of internal e-mails and documents . . . the EPA clearly appears 
anxious over how to respond to the initial reports of high lead levels 
in Flint.356 
Specifically, EPA officials discussed how to address the issue with 
the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality without “rubbing 
their noses in the fact that we’re right and they’re wrong.”357  This might 
just be a polite reminder not to inflame a situation, but the discussion 
goes on:  “(It) seems more apparent that Flint may have violated the 
(Lead and Copper Rule) by not maintaining corrosion control. . . .  I’ll 
bet that the state will take this personally since they are responsible ... 
which isn’t a bad thing, but they may get VERY defensive.”358 
The tone of the discussion certainly flies in the face of what some 
say is an over-intrusive federal hand in state affairs.  It is hard to fathom 
why any regulatory body would feel impotent in the face of a violation 
 
 355. FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 8–9. 
 356. Todd Spangler & Paul Egan, Emails: EPA Indecision Led to Inaction in Flint Crisis, DET. 
FREE PRESS (May 13, 2016, 12:07 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-
water-crisis/2016/05/12/epa-concerns-contradictions-flint/84299484/. 
 357. Id. 
 358. Id. 
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of federal law with such devastating and clear health consequences.  
Perhaps, though, this gives insight into how the EPA perceives itself 
and its power. 
The tone of the e-mail discussions is reflected in the overall 
management of Flint Water.  As noted above, the 1952 Flint water 
treatment plant was not a “new” facility that was exempt from 
corrosion control requirements.359  Yet the EPA did not challenge this 
state assertion.  And it was, at best, completely unclear whether Flint 
was using corrosion control, yet the EPA accepted the state’s word on 
the point rather than trusting and confirming.  Again and again, this 
final protection measure was weak in the face of mounting evidence 
that Flint was poisoning its citizens. 
The citizens’ impression of the EPA is summed up in the remarks 
of one attorney who has sued for the replacement of lead service lines: 
The EPA waited far too long to step in to do anything about Flint. 
The citizens of Flint are right not to trust the EPA in this situation 
and it’s necessary for the citizens to bring their own lawsuit. . . . We’ll 
continue to work as hard as we can to get safe drinking water supply 
to Flint.360 
2. EPA’s Behavior in Context 
There are a variety of factors that might have contributed to the 
EPA’s delayed response and hesitant attitude. 
a. The Federal Government Has Delegated Authority to the 
States, and States Have Asserted It. 
As we know, state-delegated programs became the norm in the 
1970’s and 1980’s.361  Initially, “states relied on EPA as a source of 
information and guidance on how to implement the federal laws.”362  
Nevertheless, this appreciation shifted to resentment over time and 
became a source of tension.  As states became more experienced with 
the implantation and regulation of federal environmental laws, they 
began to see the EPA as overbearing. 
States perceived that while EPA fulfilled its obligation . . . to seek 
input from the states, it used rules, implementation guidance 
documents, and grant purse strings to enforce a vision of how things 
 
 359. Flint Lessons Memo, supra note 79, at 2; FLINT FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 16. 
 360. Catherine Shaffer, Federal Court Allows Flint Lead Lawsuit to Proceed, MICH. RADIO 
(July 8, 2016) https://perma.cc/TMW5-RSL9. 
 361. Thomas Burack & A. Stanley Meiurg, Collaborative Federalism, 33 ENTVL. FORUM 23, 
23 (May/June 2016) [hereinafter Burack & Meiurg]. 
 362. Id. 
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should work, even if that vision differed from states’ ideas of how to 
run delegated programs equally or more effectively.363 
This led to a “movement for greater state engagement and 
‘cooperative federalism,’ in which EPA began to be more open to 
states’ view in establishing and implementing environmental 
programs.”364  As of 2016, all states, except Wyoming, have primacy 
with respect to the Safe Drinking Water Act.365  Recall also that almost 
half of the states have enacted state legislation that makes the federal 
standards, which were intended to be a floor, a ceiling.366 
Moreover, state assumption of power is not novel to the SDWA.  
“Today state governments taken as a whole are implementing some 96 
percent of the major federal programs for which they could be 
delegated or authorized, and they also conduct a vast majority of the 
data collection and the enforcement of those federal laws.”367 
b. Water is Traditionally a Local Matter 
This assumption of state power and potential resentment of 
federal authority is supported by the nature of the item being 
regulated—water supply and public safety.  Again, this is seen 
primarily as a state and local responsibility.368  With the exception of 
the 1970’s, the federal government has either stayed out of the matter 
for the most part (1700’s-1970), or it has been reducing its footprint 
(1980’s and beyond). 
c. The Federal Government Has a History of Delayed 
Involvement in Safe Water 
Recall the conversation above about what prompted the decade 
of the environment in the 1970’s.  Notably, the issue of systemic water 
contamination and pollution went unchecked for decades.  The 
assertion of federal power finally came in 1970, but it bears repeating 
that the federal government only acted after a prolonged failure of the 
states to take adequate measures.369 
 
 363. Id. 
 364. Id. at 24.  Schapiro notes a general trend in this regard: “All branches of the federal 
government have professed increased deference to state prerogatives. At the same time, the states 
have taken more active roles in formulating and implementing policy in a variety of areas.”  
SCHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 2. 
 365. See Safe Drinking Water Act Primacy Agencies, supra note 84. 
 366. Percival, supra note 340, at 1145. 
 367. Burack & Meiurg, supra note 361, at 23. 
 368. Cox, supra note 32, at 72–73. 
 369. “Like civil rights law, environmental law became federalized only after a long history of 
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And even then, the assertion had a softer side to it.  Then EPA 
Deputy Administrator, Robert Fri, optimistically predicted that, “We 
believe the enforcement provisions of the bill will be highly effective, 
almost self-executing and require little direct Federal involvement.”370 
Moreover, even though the EPA sets minimum national 
standards, “the federal environmental laws generally have been 
designed to avoid preemption of state law.”371  Scheberle, who has 
carefully studied working (and unworkable) relationships with respect 
to the implementation of environmental programs and policies, 
suggests that this “softer” approach is not altogether wrong.  Many 
scholars have noted “the error of federal overseers leaning too 
vigorously on their state counterparts to secure compliance with 
federal goals.”372  She goes on to note that, “high involvement among 
participants may not necessarily lead to positive working relationships.  
Federal staff involvement that is perceived by state officials to be 
nitpicking state programs or micromanaging state activities . . . may be 
counterproductive.”373 
d. Clean Power Plan 
In August 2015, EPA and President Obama announced the Clean 
Power Plan, which EPA describes as “a historic and important step in 
reducing carbon pollution from power plants that takes real action on 
climate change. . . . It also shows the world that the United States is 
committed to leading global efforts to address climate change.”374  
There has been significant resistance to the plan, with twenty-seven 
states, including Michigan, filing suit against the EPA,375 and the 
Supreme Court staying implementation of the plan pending judicial 
review.376  In terms of priorities, EPA may have been focused on the 
political challenge of implementing this plan rather than addressing the 
long-standing challenge of Lead and Copper Rule violations. 
 
state failure to protect what had come to be viewed as nationally important interests.”  Percival, 
supra note 340, at 1144. 
 370. March 1973 EPA Press Release, supra note 95. 
 371. Percival, supra note 340, at 1142. 
 372. SCHEBERLE, supra note 1, at 20.  This observation puts the Flint EPA e-mails in a slightly 
different light. 
 373. Id. at 21. 
 374. Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants, ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, 
https://perma.cc/3TZM-RP7Q (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Clean Power Plan]. 
 375. States Suing EPA, CTR. FOR EARTH, ENERGY & DEMOCRACY, https://perma.cc/KH3C-
GBWE  (last visited Oct. 16, 2016). 
 376. Clean Power Plan, supra note 374. 
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e. Reduction in Federal Funding Reduces Federal Moral 
Authority 
With respect to the SDWA, Congress enacted “unfunded 
mandate rules” in 1996, which, as the name suggests, protect states 
from federal requirements that are not supported by commensurate 
federal financial support.377  As noted above, however, federal funding 
has never kept pace with the amount of funding authorized by the Safe 
Drinking Water Act, and appropriations have been flat or in decline 
for a decade.378 
In addition, at a time when there are increased concerns over lead 
in drinking water, federal support for the Center for Disease Control’s 
Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Program has decreased by fifty 
percent over the past four years, from 30 million in FY 2011 to 15 
million in FY 2015.379  Notably, it was the blood samples taken as part 
of this program that provided concrete evidence of the elevated blood 
lead levels in Flint’s children in the summer of 2014.380 
These statistics suggest that one of the cornerstones of our 
cooperative federalism model (i.e., delegated authority to the states to 
implement programs with federal funds) is being undercut, which has 
two different implications.  With respect to the EPA, there might be 
concern that the reduction in federal funding signals waning support 
for the agency’s mission.  As for the states, which are given primacy 
and federal funding, they arguably may seek even more autonomy 
since they retain primacy and are taking on more of the economic 
burden. 
The conclusion here is that the EPA was overly trusting of state 
behavior and hesitant to assert its authority in Flint, yet this behavior 
did not occur in a vacuum.  There are centuries of context to consider 
that might explain the approach.  The takeaway, however, is that the 
federal government, which sits at the top of the cooperative federalism 
pyramid, is not the empowered actor in safe drinking water 
enforcement. 
 
 
 
 
 377. Percival, supra note 340, at 1141–42. 
 378. LEGISLATIVE FINANCING OPTIONS, supra note 115, at 5. 
 379. Flint Lessons Memo, supra note 79, at 6. 
 380. Id. at 9 n.44. 
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V. A COLLABORATIVE OR POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM 
CONVERSATION 
The first step to resolving any problem is to recognize that there is 
one.  Flint Water itself could be the wake-up call needed to prompt a 
reset of our cooperative federalism model, but the combination of Flint 
Water and the emerging data reported by NRDC and others should 
lead inexorably to the conclusion that the existing scheme’s 
overreliance on localities to address our nation’s twenty-first century 
challenges alone is misplaced. 
A. Working Relationships—Summing Up the Current Problem 
Scheberle suggests that the best working federal-state 
relationships are ones rooted in mutual trust and appropriate levels of 
involvement.  Trust refers to the extent that actors believe that other 
participants are dedicated to implementing the policy.381  “High levels 
of trust are evident within a relationship when actors share goals, 
respect the actions of others, allow flexibility, and support individuals 
within the program.” 382 
Considering the discussions above, one can see the lack of trust 
between the actors in our cooperative federalism model.  There is no 
shared goal with respect to infrastructure and other twenty-first 
century challenges.  The EPA violations data reveal a lack of respect 
for the safe water program.  Flexibility has gone too far and has become 
lax enforcement.  And there are persistent issues with respect to 
support—particularly funding. 
The second critical element to a working relationship is 
involvement, which includes formal and informal communication, 
oversight activities, providing funding, sharing resources, giving advice, 
and personal contact.383  The “nature of involvement, then, becomes 
one of assistance, with ample doses of technical assistance, 
consultation, and even logistical support.”384 
Considering the discussions above, one also can see the lack of 
involvement between the actors in our cooperative federalism model.  
First, although the localities are given primary responsibility for 
delivering safe water, they are not even at the table.  Ironically, 
Scheberle, who sets out to describe working relationships for the 
 
 381. SCHEBERLE, supra note 1, at 21. 
 382. Id. 
 383. Id. 
 384. Id. 
Warren - For Publication (Do Not Delete) 3/9/2017  10:29 AM 
Fall 2016] AN AMERICAN RESET 109 
implementation of environmental policies, discusses the state-federal 
relationship, not the local-state-federal relationship.  This could be the 
case because a locality is not considered a sovereign; however, the 
locality plays such a critical role in the scheme that it should be part of 
the conversation. 
Flint Water is a prime example of lack of local involvement.  The 
locality warned it was concerned about the use of the Flint River and 
the water treatment plant, yet the locality was not involved in the key 
decisions.  Those were made by the state.  Residents of Flint tried for 
more than a year to bring attention to their water safety concerns.  
They were also not heard. 
The lack of state and EPA involvement is reflected in the lack of 
enforcement of Lead and Copper Rule violations as reported by the 
NRDC.  One also must remember the reduction in state and federal 
funding with respect to the environment and infrastructure. 
A final point to consider is that EPA represents the federal 
government but the involvement of Congressional leaders also could 
be a missing element.  EPA promulgates rules and allocates resources, 
but first Congress appropriates the funds. 
B. Initial Observations 
Americans created modern federalism when the situation 
demanded it.  Americans also created the decade of the environment 
when circumstances called for bold action.  The current state of affairs 
with respect to safe water is another one of these times that demands a 
strong and innovative American response—an American reset of our 
safe drinking water model.385 
In terms of options, total pre-emption does not appear to be a 
likely or appropriate response given the local nature of water and our 
history and culture.  Reverting to a local, pre-1970 system seems 
equally inappropriate and unlikely.  So, as we were in the second half 
of the eighteenth century, we are at a time when we need to re-think 
 
 385. This shift to a “shared” role in response to national concerns also occurred with respect 
to the building of the nation’s transport infrastructure, which “was basically different from what 
has come to be known as the grant-in-aid and other joint or cooperative programs of the modern 
era, with their extensive auditing and oversight functions, conditional terms, and (above all) 
agenda-setting and basic policy formulation by Congress and federal administrators rather than 
at the state or local level.”  Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism-an 
American Tradition: Modern Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 227, 
234 (1996).  See also SCHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 35 (citing DANIEL J. ELAZAR, Theory of 
Federalism, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION. 1006 (Leonard W. Levy & 
Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2000)). 
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how multiple entities operate within a given territory.  The one 
difference today is that the question is not so much one of dividing 
power as it is of how to share power. 
Scheberle suggests that an ideal relationship would be one of high 
trust and high involvement of all actors.386  Recognizing some 
fundamental points could be a first step in the process of creating this 
relationship with respect to safe water. 
1.   Trust 
Again, trust is rooted in shared goals, respect, flexibility, and 
support. 387 
a. Shared Goal 
First, all actors involved with safe water should agree there is an 
urgent need for a twenty-first century water supply system.  We do 
have a history of coming together on national infrastructure projects.388 
b. There is a Basis for Mutual Respect 
All actors in the current scheme deserve respect.  Localities have 
an extremely difficult job and should not be required to “go it alone.”  
They are providing a service that is fundamental to human life and 
dignity.  They also are the most informed entity with respect to local 
needs.  They deserve a voice and to be heard. 
States also deserve respect for the position they have taken (or 
could take) with respect to the implementation of national water 
standards.  They have accepted primacy and have carried the load 
despite reduced federal funding.  They also are a vital link between the 
federal government and localities.  Neither entity could fulfill their 
roles effectively without the involvement of the state. 
Finally, the federal government does have a necessary and 
important role to play in safe water. 
Like civil rights law, environmental law became federalized only 
after a long history of state failure to protect what had come to be 
viewed as nationally important interests. . . . Despite [recent political 
events], most Americans continue to believe that the federal 
government should have more responsibility for environmental 
protection than the states.  This belief may reflect an understanding  
 
 
 386. SCHEBERLE, supra note 1, at 21. 
 387. Id. 
 388. Id.; see generally Scheiber, supra note 385; SCHAPIRO, supra note 25. 
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that effective environmental protection policy did not evolve until 
 . . . the federal government began to play an active regulatory role.389 
It is appropriate to question the premise that water is purely a 
local matter.390  Perhaps our reality has changed in ways that make this 
premise less valid.  First, there are national interests at stake.  All 
people are entitled to safe drinking water, regardless of the 
demographics of a city’s population.  In his 2017 budget presentation, 
Michigan’s Governor Snyder declared that “clean drinking water is a 
human necessity.”391    Economic disparity or race should not be the 
cause of some people being safe and others being poisoned.  As with 
human and civil rights, there is sometimes a need for a federal 
approach to ensure these rights. 
Beyond basic human rights looms the threat that terrorism poses 
to the security of our water supply system, which is a threat that knows 
no borders and must be monitored at a national and international level. 
There also is universal acceptance that the costs of addressing our 
water-supply infrastructure are astronomical, something that 
necessitates federal involvement.392 
c. Support 
There are mechanisms in place and other legitimate options to 
consider with respect to funding a twenty-first century water supply 
system.393  The 1970’s and 1980’s also demonstrate the actors’ capacity 
to provide expertise and support.394  In other words, these actors know 
how to support environmental goals, they just may be out of practice. 
2. Involvement—Collaborative or Polyphonic Federalism 
Addressing the “high involvement” prong of Scheberle’s 
recommendation is critical.  We should look for a new level of 
 
 389. Percival, supra note 340, at 1144 (internal citations omitted). 
 390. As Schapiro notes, we are historically predisposed to separate or compartmentalize 
topics as “local” or “national,” but these labels do not reflect the reality of our current day.  “The 
key to understanding contemporary federalism is to embrace the overlap of state and federal 
authority. That concurrence is not an aberration to be shunned, but a core reality to be accepted 
and theorized.”  SCHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 92. 
 391. FY 2017 BUDGET PRESENTATION, supra note 121, at slide 3. 
 392. “Not only are some problems better dealt with on a national (or international) basis, but 
each environmental issue also presents a set of sub problems and diverse regulatory activities, 
some of which are best undertaken centrally.”  Esty, supra note 112, at 571.  It should be noted 
that the author is not urging a federal-only approach.  This point is merely that the federal 
government should have an increased role in resolving safe-drinking water issues and financing. 
 393. See LEGISLATIVE FINANCING OPTIONS, supra note 115. 
 394. See Burack & Meiurg, supra note 361. 
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interaction and involvement between safe-drinking water actors: the 
federal government (both Congress as the funding source and EPA as 
the regulatory body) and the states.  Flint Water and the current state 
of affairs warrant that these actors reconsider their relationship with 
one another and the power structure that will be needed to bring safe 
water to all Americans.  It also is time to consider extending more 
official positions to other safe water actors.  Given their involvement 
and interests, should localities and consumers also be considered actors 
within this framework and be given formal roles? 
It will be the task of experts in many fields to “reset” our existing 
system, but this article is meant to encourage the conversation.  One 
model to discuss involves actors working as co-regulators in a 
collaborative or polyphonic federalism scheme.  These approaches 
differ in some ways, but both reflect the idea of shared power and 
shared responsibility. 
a. Collaborative Federalism 
One form of the interaction “reset” could be drawn from the 
recent development of the E-Enterprise for the Environment program.  
It has been labeled a “collaborative federalism” approach that involves 
the creation of joint state-EPA governance bodies to streamline 
reporting for regulated facilities, akin to using one software system to 
file multiple tax returns.395 
“E-Enterprise embodies a cultural shift in how environmental co-
regulators work together and deliver environmental protection 
services.”396  The goal of the program is to modernize the “business of 
environmental protection . . . [by] improving environmental protection 
through better program performance, enhancing services to regulated 
entities, the public, and agency partners; and operating as a 
transformative model of joint governance.”397 
The project involves officials “leveraging their collective 
resources, expertise, and experience” to create “new, deeper 
partnerships.”398  A key aspect of the program’s success is that the 
partners “had to accept each other as co-regulators and to  
 
 395. Id. at 23.  It should be noted at the outset that this joint governance system had a strong 
foundation, as the parties had a positive working relationship and a shared goal by virtue of 
previous interactions.  Id. at 24.  To some extent, this is not an existing condition for safe drinking 
water, so the base points would have to be addressed as noted below. 
 396. Id. at 23. 
 397. Id. at 24. 
 398. Id. 
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acknowledge that their individual success depended upon their 
collective success.”399 
The project was launched in September 2013, when the 
Environmental Council of the States and EPA executed the Charter 
for the State and EPA E-Enterprise Leadership Council.400  This joint 
governance body is co-chaired by a state environmental commissioner 
and the EPA deputy administrator.401  There is an Executive 
Committee, which focuses on policy and strategic issues, while a 
Management Board and an Interoperability and Operations Team 
focus on day-to-day tasks and implementation of individual projects.402  
A benefit to this model is that “co-regulators are fully engaged in and 
committed to this work at both the political and career levels, and that 
a solid governance foundation exists to support transformative cultural 
change in the future.” 403 
b. Polyphonic Federalism 
Schapiro’s work on “polyphonic federalism” strikes a similar 
chord and may inform the conversation of how to create a system of 
co-regulators or joint safe-water actors.  One way to understand the 
concept is in comparison to other forms of federalism.  Unlike dual 
federalism or even cooperative federalism, to a certain extent, which 
ask “whether some activity belongs on the state or federal side of a line, 
polyphonic federalism asks how the overlapping power of the state and 
federal governments can best address a particular issue.”404  Unlike the 
collaborative E-Enterprise model described above, which involves the 
creation of a distinct joint-governance body, in a polyphonic regime 
“the state and federal governments occupy the same place at the same 
time, yet they maintain their institutional identities.”405 
Polyphonic federalism also might be understood by way of 
metaphor.  Polyphony refers to ‘‘the simultaneous and harmonious 
combination of several individual melodic lines.’”406  Historically, 
scholars have depicted federalism in graphic terms (e.g., layered-cake 
 
 399. Id. 
 400. Id. 
 401. Id. 
 402. Id. 
 403. Id. 
 404. SCHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 96. 
 405. Id. 
 406. Id. at 94 (internal citation omitted).  “The fugues of Johann Sebastian Bach and the 
canon of Johann Pachelbel are prominent examples of polyphonic compositions.”  Id. 
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federalism or marble-cake federalism).407  According to Schapiro, using 
sound as a metaphor is a more apt approach.  Visually “it is difficult to 
imagine two items occupying the same space, without displacing each 
other or combining into a single new, unified whole. The choice is a 
marble cake or a stew. Sound, on the other hand, can combine into new 
melodies, without losing its individual character.”408 
In the polyphonic conception, federalism is characterized by the 
existence of multiple, independent sources of political authority. The 
scope of this political authority is not defined by subject matter. No 
kind of conduct is categorically beyond the boundaries of state or 
federal jurisdiction; the federal and state governments function as 
alternative centers of power. In the first instance, any matter is 
presumptively within the authority of the federal government and of 
a state government. Full concurrent power is the norm. A polyphonic 
conception of federalism thus resists the idea of defining enclaves of 
state power protected from federal intrusion. . . . [P]olyphonic 
federalism focuses on facilitating and structuring the interaction of 
state and federal governments.409 
Schapiro argues that polyphonic federalism systems are more 
innovative and resilient.410  He also notes that “the interaction of state 
and federal power better advances the substantive goals generally 
associated with federalism, including efficiency, democratic 
participation, and liberty.” 411 
c. Discussion Items for an American Reset Toward Collaborative 
or Polyphonic Federalism 
One benefit to the collaborative or polyphonic models is that they 
encourage dialogue.412  They also create the opportunity for the 
partners to solve problems in ways that exceed what one could have 
accomplished on its own.413 
 
 
 407. Morton Grodzins, The Federal System, in AMERICAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
RELATIONS: FOUNDATIONS, PERSPECTIVES, AND ISSUES 55 (Laurence J. O’Toole Jr. ed., 2000). 
 408. SCHAPIRO, supra note 25, at 94. 
 409. Id. at 95. 
 410. Id. at 92. 
 411. Id. 
 412. Id. at 98. 
 413. See Burack & Meiurg, supra note 361; Engel, supra note 31, at 168–69 (discussing the 
development of low emission vehicle standards by capitalizing on both state and federal 
mechanisms); DAVID E. ADELMAN & KIRSTEN H. ENGEL, Adaptive Environmental Federalism, 
in PREEMPTIVE CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 
(William W. Buzbee ed., 2009) (comparing dynamic federalism to complex adaptive systems in 
terms of the benefits and strengths they produce). 
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What follows are several discussion items that could be used to 
start the conversation of how to “reset” toward a collaborative or 
polyphonic federalism framework. 
1. Who are the actors?  Is safe water a governance issue 
between state and EPA only?  Or should consumers, 
localities, and Congressional leaders also have an active role 
or voice? 
2. How does one shift from the existing power structure to one 
of shared power between the identified actors?  What 
changes in philosophy and in law are required?414 
3. How does one encourage innovation in water-supply system 
development?  Is it time to re-think water supply systems 
rather than simply improve upon our century-old 
framework?415  Should we also take the opportunity to 
discuss integration of safe water, land use, energy, and 
national security policies?416 
 
 414. One initial point may to be expand on the “rules of engagement” noted by Bridget Fahey 
in her recent article, Consent Procedures and American Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1561, 1567 
(2015) (noting that “these rules would dictate how the states and federal government are obliged 
to treat one another when they join together their respective power, resources, and democratic 
legitimacy to achieve a common goal”).  Fahey credits Robert Schapiro for coining the term “rules 
of engagement.”  Id. at 1629 n.16.  This concept would be expanded to include other safe drinking 
water actors if they are identified.  See also Engel, supra note 31; ADELMAN & ENGEL, supra note 
413. Another idea in terms of how these parties could share power is to consider a variation of 
the “matching principle” suggested by Butler and Macey in 2006.  See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan 
R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental 
Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 25 (1996).  Butler and Macy suggest that one 
could identify which governmental actor is best suited to address an issue by evaluating the size 
of the geographic area affected by the environmental concern.  This same principle could be 
applied when evaluating the role of a particular actor in a shared power structure–that is, focus 
on the issue at hand and who is best suited to address it or take the lead.  Although ultimate 
responsibility would be shared amongst all actors, the “point” may be taken by different actors 
or different governing bodies at different times depending on the nature of the particular 
challenge.  Again, this structure would involve shared responsibility and accountability, not 
simply the delegation of responsibility in a dualist or cooperative federalism framework. 
 415. While technical realities made water supply a purely local matter in the 1800’s when 
major water supply systems were first created in cities like Philadelphia and Boston, one has to 
wonder what a newly conceptualized system would look like today.  If we were to create a system 
today, for the first time, would we rely on this local model?  Or does it make more sense to develop 
regional or multi-locality systems, which would be taking the same approach as our electric power 
grid?  This approach might help achieve the recommendations of the Science Advisory Board 
and EPA with respect to the consolidation of small systems in order to achieve economies of scale 
and improve compliance, etc.  See SCHEBERLE, supra note 1, at 138.  A regionalized system also 
might provide better protection from terrorism.  Finally, this approach could lend itself to water 
transfers and the equalization of water level disparities.  Perhaps treated flood water from one 
region could be purchased by drought-stricken areas, and water-use disputes could be resolved 
collaboratively. 
 416. See Comments of Peter Gleick, Pacific Institute, Columbia Water Center Earth Initiative 
Panel Discussion (Mar. 2016) (notes on file with the author). 
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4. What mechanisms will be used to reach necessary and 
appropriate funding levels?417 
5. What can be done to improve accurate reporting and 
information gathering and sharing?418 
6. How should at-risk water systems and communities be 
identified and work prioritized?419 
Again, the idea is to recognize the inherent inability of cooperative 
federalism to address our twenty-first century challenges.  The scheme 
is flawed because it places the heaviest burden on the least powerful 
and capable actor.  If we continue to persist in this model, despite direct 
evidence that some localities are not capable of providing safe water, 
Flint Water will be repeated elsewhere across this country.  An 
alternative is to agree that we need a new model and to begin a 
conversation about whether collaborative or polyphonic federalism is 
best suited to address the challenges ahead. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There is a well-known warning that those who cannot remember 
the past are bound to repeat it.  The quote is sometimes attributed 
erroneously to Winston Churchill.420  It actually comes from 
philosopher George Santayana, who wrote in 1905: “Progress, far from 
consisting in change, depends on retentiveness. . . . Those who cannot 
remember the past are condemned to repeat it.421 
The sentiment, regardless of attribution, rings true today.  Flint 
Water is now part of our history.  Will we evaluate and reflect honestly 
on its causes?  And will we act as the answers come to us to make sure 
that another Flint Water is not part of our future? 
 
 
 417. See LEGISLATIVE FINANCING OPTIONS, supra note 115 for initial starting points. 
 418. The E-Enterprise model might be particularly instructive here. 
 419. This question, in and of itself, reflects the benefits of a collaborative or polyphonic system 
where all actors are involved and share power to achieve a common goal.  Localities, consumers, 
and states can help identify local or regional needs, and the federal voice can serve to collate the 
ideas into a broader framework.  Because all actors are working toward a unified goal of safe 
water, a goal that is no longer purely local or purely federal, decisions can be made, at least 
theoretically, in support of that unified goal.  The ability to achieve this result in reality will 
depend on how well the actors can answer discussion item number 1 (i.e., which actors will have 
a role); item 2 (i.e., how will power be shared); and item 4 (i.e., how will the actors obtain 
necessary funding). 
 420. Those Who Fail to Learn from History, NAT’L CHURCHILL MUSEUM BLOG (Nov. 16, 
2012), https://perma.cc/8DC9-4RMU. 
 421. GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON OR THE PHASES OF HUMAN PROGRESS, 
INTRODUCTION AND REASON IN COMMON SENSE 284 (1905). 
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Churchill does have something to say to us about our options.  In  
 
1935, when Great Britain lost air parity with Hitler, Churchill said this 
in the House of Commons: 
When the situation was manageable it was neglected, and now that 
it is thoroughly out of hand we apply too late the remedies which 
then might have effected a cure. There is nothing new in the story. . 
. . It falls into that long, dismal catalogue of the fruitlessness of 
experience and the confirmed unteachability of mankind. Want of 
foresight, unwillingness to act when action would be simple and 
effective, lack of clear thinking, confusion of counsel until the 
emergency comes, until self-preservation strikes its jarring gong–
these are the features which constitute the endless repetition of 
history.422 
These sentiments describe Flint Water itself; the hope is that they 
will not describe our response—both in terms of helping those who 
have been affected by lead and addressing our federalism challenges.  
There are fundamental flaws in our existing model of cooperative 
federalism.  We must come to terms with them and face the hard truths 
about our history and current political climate.  Do let us take that path 
and avoid being twenty-first century incarnations of Churchill’s 
“unteachables.” It’s time for a reset. 
 
 
 422. Remarks by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons (May 2, 1935), 
https://perma.cc/QH9Y-HFRW; See Winston S. Churchill, THE GATHERING STORM 99–113 
(1948) (describing the political action (or lack of action) that led to the loss of air parity). 
